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CHAPTER

INTRODUCTION:

I

HYPOTHESIS AND METHODS

This thesis considers the diplomacy between
two

nations on the issue of nuclear non-proliferation,
spe-

cifically the United States and the state of Israel.
"problem" of nuclear non-proliferation admits

dimension almost immediately,
tion necessarily

i.e.,

is

normative

a

nuclear prolifera-

bad thing internationally?

a

The

For the

purposes of this thesis, one must answer "yes" based on
U.S. neo-realist assumptions.

All nation-states are not

equally capable of "handling"
with prudence.

A

a

nuclear weapons option

multiplicity of nuclear weapons states

would tend to inhibit the freedom of action of the super-

powers in the regional affairs in which they have an interest.

In

effect,

a

multi-polar nuclear world enhances

the probability of at the very least regional nuclear con-

flict, which would have catastrophic global consequences.

This aspect of U.S. -Israeli relations

is

of some

importance given the highly complex and conflict-prone
nature of international politics in the Middle East.

The

regional "nuclear dimension" has also been somewhat

neglected by contemporary scholars, who have favored the

Palestinian question, the recent Iran-Iraq war, or the
political effects of Islamic fundamentalism.

1

It

is

important for the long term that this
issue be thoroughly
analyzed if for no other reason than to
delineate past

mistakes and future opportunities for the
nonproliferation seeking super-power (in this case,
the
U S A
.

.

.

)

For the purposes of this thesis, we shall
start

.

with the philosophical aspect of this subdiscipline
of

international relations.
This is

a

neo-realist approach to nuclear non-

proliferation as
by power

it

the security interests as defined

is

that determine the status of the problem.

In

this sense the United States, which is the power pre-

dominant actor, acts as

a

Israel.

is

it

is

Since the U.S.

assumed that

it

patron to the client-state,
the power predominant actor,

ought to be able to periodically

influence the foreign policy of Israel.

persuasion can be benign or coercive, but

The power of
is

always

applied in the name of the common interests shared by
both nations.

Those interests are normative in the end,

but are also "realistic" in that they express the neces-

sities of nation-state survival.

Hence interests are the

"goals" set by the nation-state which
of analysis

is

the basic level

inherent in neo-realism.

The national actor moves in an anarchical inter-

national environment, Hobbes' "war of all against all,"
lacking

a

forceful "transnational authority."

2

Nations

are both ll.ee

t

o

and forced continually to pursue
their

own survival internationally.

interests, or worse,

Failure to pursue one's

interests unsuccessfully enacted can

lead to national annihilation.

A realist reading of his-

tory describes literally hundreds of
empires, kingdoms and

countries destroyed or conquered for the above
reasons.
This is in part the rat ional-realist
decision-makers' spur
to action:

sure knowledge that anarchy or national dis-

placement will result from unpursued national interests.

Anarchy is not necessarily universal in scope.
Certain regions of the world tend to interstate violence
and anarchy more frequently than others.

number of reasons for this:

There are

a

composition of the elite

national decision-makers, cultural-religious or economic
factors.
It can be

stated that the state of Israel exists in

an extremely anarchic and violent regional environment.

At various times and for many reasons,

the surrounding

Arab states have pledged themselves to either the destruction or the emasculation of the Jewish free state.

Israel

has no regional allies and has fought four major wars to

safeguard its interests and existence along with

a

number

of recurrent skirmishes on the periphery since its founding

in

1948.

Because

it

is

outnumbered on all sides by

hostile populations, the quest for security has an acute

3

importance for Israeli decision-makers.

Security in this

case meaning the preservation of Israeli
sovereignty and
its freedom of action internationally.
Due
to the con-

flictual and violence-prone tendency of
international

politics in the region, the security interest
of Israel
tends to have a strong military element.
Given this,

a

nation-state in Israel's situation

will tend to emphasize worst case security scenarios
and

will rely almost totally on military power to deter an

adversary

s

aggression.

The efficacity of the doctrine

of national security lies in its reliance on deterrence
to prevent an opponent

military threats.

from carrying out any number of

Deterrence

is

the threat to impose

unacceptable losses upon an aggression-minded opponent.
Since

a

nation-state cannot survive

under constant military assault,
is

a

if

it

is

isolated and

doctrine of deterrence

necessary to ensure long term survival and internal

development.

Lacking peace, anarchy can only be reduced

via deterrence of specific nation-state opponents.

To survive and to deter successfully,

a

state in

Israel's circumstances must seek out some type of alliance

with other nation-states if for no other reason than to
offset the radical limitations on its capabilities imposed
by its size,

time,

location, resources and population.

Israel has moved into

Over

client type relation with

a

4

the United States in terms of
economic aid, military

equipment and political support and
guidance
to come to

a

in

modus vivendi with the Arab states.

attempting
The

classical realist analysis of this situation
assigns the
interested power-predominant actor (i.e.,
the
U.S.)

leading role in

the

patron-client relationship in setting

a

the political agenda.

Although Israel

to be a formal ally of

the U.S.,

is not

there are

a

considered
number of

benign yet potent political and social connections
that
have accumulated between the two countries over
the last

twenty-five years.

By and

large,

these "connections"

have served Israel well with little cost in sovereignty
and regional capabilities.

The power predominant actor,

in

this case the United

States who is Israel's single largest supplier of both

military hardware

(a

vital necessity and symbol of commit-

ment given Israel's strategic dilemma) and economic

largesse--some $3 billion

a

year in economic aid alone.

These tangible benefits linked to systemic similarities

between the two countries along with the sizable population of expatriate American Jews residing in Israel ought
to give the U.S.

potent influence over Israeli foreign

policy.
As shall be seen,

the U.S.A.'s power predominant

position may be irrelevant when
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it

comes to non-

proliferation policy in the Israeli case.

This is

a

simplistic definition of nation-state
power predominance
but
It

it

is

consonant with basic neo-real i st

ic

thinking.

follows then that the United States
ought to be able

influence the foreign policy of its client
state over
certain critical issues.
Israel certainly cannot risk
to

abandonment by the United States, as some
twenty-five
years of sporadic diplomacy has not brought any
amelioration in Israel's regional position.

Neo-realism further postulates that the client-state
has only minimal influence over the actions of its
patron

since

a

small nation cannot set the political agenda for

the patron state,

or rather

it

should not be permitted to

set the policy for the major power over

a

issue.

hegemonic hold

The super-power may not have

on the region, but

it

a

specific

does possess significant influence

over its client partner, who maintains this asymmetrical

relation out of the necessity of survival.
Thomas Schelling has discussed

a

similar occurrence

that he refers to as "the power of the weak."

In

essence this describes the ability of weaker allied
nations to force

a

great power to alter its diplomatic

policy radically in favor of the political aims of the
weaker state.

In

its "pure

accomplished by engaging

in

form" this is occasionally

deliberately provocative acts

6

SO that

the great power patron will
have no choice but to
sanction its clients' behavior in
some

positive manner in

order to prevent
a

disruption of its alliance system and

a

loss of prestige.

gives

is

The classic example that Schelling

Chiang Kai Shek's occupation of the
islands of

Quemoy and Matus with something like one-half
his army in
1958 in order to force the United States
to recognize
and

to militarily guarantee

the contigenous waters of these

islands for the nationalist Chinese.

nationalist army in

a

By placing the

deliberately provocative and pos-

sibly dangerous position, Chiang forced the Eisenhower

administration to change its geo-strategic policy
Taiwan straits.
as shall be seen.

in

the

This echoes this thesis in some ways,
In

the Israeli case it

is

not

a

tangible threat of immediate policy pre-emption (as in
the Taiwan straits crisis)

weak,

but rather the potential for policy pre-emption

inherent in
in

an

that confers "the power of the

a

nuclear armed Israel that perceives itself

insoluble politico-military crisis.

Nuclear weapons based deterrence

is

accepted by most

nations with explicit security dilemmas as the most efficient means to threaten/inf lict massive losses on an

opponent for the least expenditure

in

national resources.

The main obstruction to acquiring nuclear weapons is the

rather high capital costs embedded
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in

the facilities nec-

essary to develop them.

Nonetheless,

if

the national

security dilemma is sufficiently
acute, many nations that
are relatively "developed” and
are determined
to pay the

price can obtain nuclear weapons.

Both the knowledge and

the capability to construct nuclear
weapons have

a

con-

straining impact on regional politics and
the pace of the
local arms race.
Power seeking, in the name of national
security, is conditioned heavily by state
capabilities.
Nuclear weapons are in turn

part of those capabilites.

a

Nuclear weapons are intrinsically important to neorealist theory as they have the ability,

used,

if

to

abolish political competition and the nation-state
system.
Of

themselves, nuclear weapons have no constructive use,

yet human decision-makers impute an intricate and arbi-

trary value to their acquisition.

It

is

only relative to

highly ambiguous terms like victory or defeat or the neorealist ethic of national survival that such weapons have
any worth at all.

Once the capital costs of

infrastructure have been absorbed, though,
weapons option
Of course,

is

a

a

nuclear

nuclear

relatively economically cost efficient.

cost efficiency must be weighed against

a

more

sober assessment by the nation state as to whether nuclear

weapons constitute

a

"politically" efficient option.

An Israel armed with nuclear weapons either overtly
or covertly has enormous

implications both for Middle

8

Eastern and world politics.
of the United States,

have

it

is

Since Israel is

a

"client"

assumed that Washington would

great deal of interest and influence
over nuclear

a

weapons decision-making in Israel.

U.S. policy since the

Eisenhower administration has been to
publicly oppose
nuclear proliferation in the region and
to especially
oppose any Israeli acquisition of nuclear
weapons.
In
practice and in contradiction to conventional
realist
thinking, this has not been the case over
the

last twenty-

five years.

The basic research question of this thesis

must ask "Why has U.S. diplomacy failed to
dissuade Israel
from acquiring nuclear weapons?"
two basic points:

(a)

This question assumes

That Israel in fact does possess

nuclear weapons, and (b) That the United States has made
efforts to alter Israeli nuclear policy.

The historic

record will verify both of these items with dispatch.
It

macy
to

a

is

hoped that this case study in "nuclear diplo-

and pa t r on- c 1 i en t relations can help point the way

revised theory of neo-realism in international rela-

tions that takes into account the capabilities of allied

powers to deflect and influence the policies of the power-

predominant actor.

Ultimately,

the whole classical con-

cept of power and influence might need to be revised.
it

may well now be that

a

For

client state can under certain

circumstances create and maintain
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a

particular policy

in

.

vital Issue area despite strong
cues from the allied
major power to revise its goals.
In this case, national
survival via ambiguous nuclear deterrence
comprises the
vital issue area.
a

In

fact,

one can say that Israel occupies an

altogether new category in non-proliferation
studies,
that of an ambiguous nuclear weapons state.

Israel is

a

country that leaves publicly ambiguous both
its possession
of and

fundamental strategy behind its nuclear weapons.

Given the explicit nature of the security dilemma for
Israel and the need to maintain strong military ties with
the West,

this was probably

Hence,

if

a

prudent option.

the research question asks why U.S. policy

failed to revise or excise Israel's nuclear ambitions,
then one must also delinate how Israel maintained its

nuclear policy over time given the sometimes considerable

coercion to do otherwise.

The main emphasis of this

thesis is to examine U.S. policy and in
to compare them to the relevant

Analyzing
be seen,

a

subsidiary sense

Israeli counterpol i c i es

failed or suboptimal policy (or, as shall

ser i es of policies) holds particular problems

the researcher,

as one must comment at

tain preferred outcomes did not occur.
turn,

a

tends to generate

a

for

length on why cerA "non event,"

in

disturbing variety of alterna-

tive explanations and analyses.
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It

is

thought that non-proliferation
policy with
regard to Israel has been of
unstable saliency for the
U.S. government for the last
twenty-five years.
It is
evident (as shall be seen) that
during certain periods in
recent U.S. history the entire
issue of Israeli nuclear
development has been of more positive
importance than it
was during other periods with
differing decision-makers.
In

fact,

it

can be shown that American policy
in this

matter virtually contradicted itself.

A mutable policy

said to be ineffective if for no
other reason than a
client state has an incentive to resist
a patron's political pressure on the assumption that
a favorable foreign
is

policy revision

is

likely.

addition, as Thomas

In

Schelling would point out, the client state
does have the
ability to place a higher priority and assign
greater
resources to

a

particular policy option than does an

over-extended super-power, comparatively speaking.
will be seen,

Israel will prove

i

As

mm une to certain blunt

forms of U.S. coercion due to its status, political and

cultural ties to America.

In

Israel itself,

the

issue of

nuclear development has been of steady saliency throughout
seven governments, starting with David Ben Gurion in 1960.
In

short,

a

vacillating unstable super-power policy

match under the right conditions for

a

no

steady long-term

high saliency counter policy on the part of

11

is

a

client state.

As for the terminology
used herein, salience defines
an issue of central
importance to the national
security
of a particular nation.
It is axiomatic that not
all
interests can be acted upon,
therefore, a certain ordering
of issues must occur.
This "prioritization" process
defines what problems and policies
are of high, low or nonsalieney.
In the end, interests are
not readily quantifiable, but it is possible to
determine how generally
important they are over time and whether
or not they were

successfully acted upon.
The methodology used herein is

ranging review of the literature.

a

detailed, wide-

These include journal

articles from diverse commentators, newspaper
accounts,
edited volumes, Congressional testimony,

a

few declassi-

fied government documents and various single
author works.

Sources tend to be eclectic with the research
emphasis on

verifying the facts by playing contending authors off
one
another.

This hypothesis then has some basis in historic

fact and current academic thinking.

To understand more

completely the diplomatic context that Israel inhabits,
it

has been necessary not only to review writings dealing

with Middle Eastern nuclear development, but also to

familiarize oneself with the general foreign policy works

dealing with the region.
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CHAPTER
ISON -PROLIFERATION

II

AS A GENERAL PROBLEM

IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Nuclear proliferation as

political phenomenon

a

describes the horizontal spread of
nuclear weapons and/or
in a more ephemeral sense
nuclear weapons capabilities to
"other nations." This diffusion of
capabilities
to

multivariety of nations

is

paradoxically enough as

a

in world affairs.

a

viewed by both East and West,

dangerous destabilizing tendency

Both the United States and the Soviet

Union view proliferation as specifically increasing
the
chances of

a

"catalytic" nuclear conflict breaking out.

^ cataly tic nuclear conflict

defined as

is

a

regional

nuclear exchange between client states that risks an un-

controllable escalation to the level of
tation between the super -power s

.

a

direct confron-

The spread of nuclear

weapon to the Third World will inhibit the great power's
ability to influence those self same events and govern-

ments--espec ially
U.S.S.R. fear

a

in a

time of crisis.

The U.S. and the

nuclear armed world that lacks the fragile

but carefully constructed rules governing nuclear deter-

rence and diplomacy they have built up over the years.
The super-powers have

a

consensual view of the

problem which has remained generally stable over the last
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twenty-five years.

As such,

there are four basic

reactive/preventative approaches that
the major powers
have evolved to deal with
this problem.

non-proliferation measure

is

The best known

the 1968 Nuclear Non-

Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its
main institution, the
International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA).
The IAEA was created in 1955
as

a

result of the

Atoms for Peace" program initiated
by U.S. President
Eisenhower in 1953. Mandated as an
associated organize
t

1

°n of the U N
-

-

with the express mission to assist
in

the promotion of civilian uses
of nuclear energy,

IAEA also has
to

a

non-proliferation role as

it

the

undertakes

inspect the nuclear facilities of
non-proliferation

treaty signatories so as to prevent the
diversion of

material and technology to military uses.

The first

function had precedence in the agency for about
twelve
years,

until the draft of the non-proliferation treaty

came into force in July of 1968.^

Since that time,

the

agency has been charged with overseeing the inspection
and "enforcement" function of the treaty signatories.

The non-proliferation treaty, on the other hand,
a

is

multilateral accord (signed at present by some 125

nations) whereby all parties, unless exempted otherwise,
must foreswear the fabrication of nuclear weapons.
turn,

those signatories' powers are guaranteed "full

14

In

.

access

to all civilian applications
of nuclear energy

under Article IV of the treaty.

The NPT is

a

result of

negotiations between the United States
and the U.S.S.R.
during the 1964-68 period. 5 There
was never any serious

dissension between the two super-powers
over what

a

non-

proliferation agreement ought to both address
and ignore.
The real conflict centered on trying
to draft a
treaty

that would be acceptable in the eighteen
nation Disarma-

ment Conference and then to the General
Assembly of the
U.N.
Most developing countries were critical
(and remain
so to this day) of the promise of access
to civilian tech-

nology and the vaguely-worded "security pledge"
by the
nuc lear - armed sponsoring powers to non-nuclear
weapons

states
The NPT does have certain flaws.

For example,

in

order to ensure the widest possible adherence to the
treaty,

the civilian promise of nuclear technology has to

be upheld in order to gain

military nuclear option.

a

multilateral surrender of the

Although such

a

dichotomy may

be in the long run entirely artificial and unrealistic

given the similarity between

a

well-developed peaceful

and an all-out nuclear weapons program.

col leg i a 1 i ty

,

While practicing

the NPT has no mechanism for dealing with

nonsignatories with nuclear weapons aspirations.

For

treaty members, the NPT sets up strongly asymmetrical

15

obligations, nuclear weapons states who are
signatories
can maintain and expand their nuclear
arsenals under the

vaguest admonition to seek disarmament.
time,

At the same

signatory "non nuclear" states believe with some

justification that the major powers have reneged on their
pledge to disarm in

a

timely fashion.

Despite these reservations, the treaty was duly
approved by the U.N. General Assembly in the spring of
1968 and opened for signature in July of that year.

Regardless of its deficiencies, the NPT has served as

a

powerful brake on nuclear weapons development worldwide-no signatory party has ever publicly "broken" the treaty
and acquired nuclear weapons.

The second major non-proliferation approach favored
by the major powers have been the supplies controls imple-

mented by the so-called "London Suppliers Group" of 1975.
This

is

a

loose organization of Western/Eastern developed

nations (the U.S., Japan, the U.K., Italy, West Germany,
and the U.S.S.R.) who all agreed to practice restraint of

trade in terms of certain types of nuclear technologies.

The suppliers group essentially utilizes

a

strategy of

exclusion, allegedly aiming its policies at ensuring

a

purely civilian nuclear trade with primarily non-

signatories of the NPT.
to honor a "trigger

Each member of the group pledges

list" of particular technological
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items such that their export to

a

non-NPT party by

a

group member is grounds for imposing
IAEA safeguards on
6
the transaction
.

It was

thought in the West especially at
this time
that supplier controls were necessary
to slow an ominous
trend toward ambiguous nuclearization
among non-NPT developing nations.
The problem with this approach is that

with the exception of France all the members
of the suppliers group are signatories to the NPT who
have pledged
,

to allow all

signatories access to the civilian uses of

nuclear energy.

Many Third World NPT members see the

suppliers group as an abrogation of the Western powers'

obligations under Article IV of the agreement.
said suppliers'

Of course,

controls do not directly affect NPT mem-

bers whose facilities are already under IAEA safeguards,
but

it

does indicate to the Third World that the developed

nations lack confidence in their own non-proliferation
treaty.

Since the supplier controls were inspired in part

by India's ability to construct and detonate

a

nuclear

device despite piecemeal export controls on the part of
the West, many developing countries contended that the

trigger lists and great power consensus were the first
step in the creation of

cartel.

In effect,

a

Western/Eastern bloc nuclear

the West was seen as backing away

from its commitments to collegiality and institutionalism.
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The third means of implementing
non-proliferation
policy favored by the U.S.A. /U.S.S.R.
is one of pure unilateral action to prevent an ally
or client from acquiring
the means to fabricate nuclear
weapons.

"Unilateralism"

means that nuclear policy for an allied
power
by

fiat from the power-predominant
actor.

dictated

is

This

is

prob-

ably the most reassuring approach to
non-proliferation,
for the super-powers as correctly
implemented it virtually

guarantees that no spread of nuclear weapons will
occur.
The problem is that the major powers have
only

a

somewhat

limited number of clients over which they have
sufficient

authority to successfully pursue this policy.

In

the

case of the U.S.S.R., the entire Warsaw Pact has always
been denied the right to develop or construct any type
of

plutonium reprocessing facilities or uranium separation
plants.

Nuclear weapons, both policy and direct military

control, have always been an exclusive province of the

Soviet Union alone in Eastern Europe.
on the other hand,

The United States,

was instrumental in inducing Japan,

Canada, Mexico, and most of the other NATO allies to at
least sign or abide by the non-proliferation treaty.

closer and more "dependent" the ally,
for a major power

the easier it is

to pursue a unilateralist policy--as

far as this truism goes,

Israel serves as one of the

except ions.

18

The

Lastly,

there is the purely regional
approach of the
nuclear weapons tree zone whicn is
composed of a local
quorum of nations agreeing to foreswear
the production or
deployment of nuclear weapons and further
pledge to verify
and police the accord by means set up
by themselves,
ihere are two examples of this type of
approach operating

currently,

the twenty-three nation 1957 Latin American

fluclear Weapons Tree Zone,

llatelolco.

also known as the Treaty of

ilatelolco" negotiated independently under

Mexican auspices during the mid-1950s, simply provides
tnat all parties to the treaty shall keep their
nations

free of nuclear weapons of any type^
it

is

important to note that the Latin American nuc-

lear weapons free zone is the only one of the four above

approaches to non-proliferation that was ever successfully

generated by

a

non-Western or Eastern source.

The South

American talks had the tacit approval of Washington and
Moscow, who were at the time preparing
the HPT.

in fact,

usually effective,

final draft of

a

nuclear weapons free zones, while unare merely

a

modification on the HPT

themes of inclusion and collegiali ty

In no sense can

.

this approach strongly affect the nuclear weapons

aspirations of

a

“defecting" nation.

The worldwide non-proliferation “system" as such is
a

consensual creation of the

U

.

S . A. /U

.

S

.

S

.

R.

for

it

is an

issue that both powers tend towards
an easy and consistent
agreement.
However, all the consensus,
institutionalization and treaties in the world cannot
enforce a totally

nuclear-free system (and perhaps that
inus,

is

not the goal),

there have always been nuclear aspiring
countries.

Israel is of course an excellent example
of

a

country with

an overriding security dilemma whose
leaders collectively

ignored the external pressures to accommodate
inter-

national non-proliferation mores in order to
pursue

covert nuclear weapons program.

a

Israel itself is not

a

party to any known non-proliferation arrangement,
save
only the l^bJ Nuclear Test ban Treaty which only forbids

above-ground or sea bed testing of nuclear weapons.
Israel has made it a ae facto foreign policy precept
to remain outside this non-proliferation "system" since

19bb as three out of four of the above approaches are

either inapplicable,

Jerusalem.

impractical, or undesirable for

As for a regional nuclear weapons free zone,

tnat has yet to be tested in the Middle East and probably

will not be any time soon, due to the potent antipathy
the countries have in that region both for Israel and for

each other.

This is an example of the scope of Israel's

isolation in international affairs when
nuclear issues.
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it comes

to

CHAPTER III

CONCEPTUAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ISRAELI NUCLEAR
OPTION

It

is

a

central assumption of this thesis that the

state of Israel does indeed possess

a

significant stock-

pile of nuclear weapons and has had access to these
wea

l

ns since at

least 1971.

radical observation and

is

This is by no means

a

corroborated extensively by

U.S. government sources and the research of such scholars
as Robert Harkavy,

Peter Pry, Avigdor Haselkorn and

Leonard Spector, all of whom have either
in

a

strong interest

the politics of the Middle East or in nuclear prolifer-

ation itself.

The general consensus in academia is that

Israel has had an arsenal of nuclear weapons for at least

twenty-five years.

The debate continues, however, over

exactly how many warheads Israel has stockpiled and the

qualitative characteristics of those weapons.

Moreover,

the actual nuclear strategy favored by Israel in time of

war is open to question.

weapons

is

far

The evidence of Israeli nuclear

too extensive to address in

a

comprehensive

manner owing to the vast multiplicity of data accumulated
since 1968.

Given all this, the Israeli position on regional

proliferation

is

deceptively simple:

"Israel will not be

the first country to introduce nuclear weapons into the
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Middle East."

This was the "party line" laid down by

Prime Minister Levi Eshkol in 1964.

8

This statement has

become the consistent Israeli non-proliferation stance
for the last twenty-five years.

fact,

In

if one

literal interpretation of this announcement,

already have been inoperative when
ated.

Why?

a

may

first enunci-

Both the United States and the Soviet Union

maintain sizeable naval squadrons
of

it was

it

takes

the Middle East.

in

the adjacent waters

These fleets are in fact armed with

tactical and possibly strategic nuclear weapons--by an
Israeli definition, nuclear weapons have already been

introduced into the region (if only by extra-regional

parties).

9

time of military crisis,

In a

the rational-

ization can be made that explicit Israeli nuclear threats
do not constitute

a

"first introduction."

Further, the statement-as-policy does not deny

specifically the possession of nuclear weapons,

it

merely

delineates under what conditions nuclear weapons will not
be alluded to.

In no way are weapons used

threats or retaliatory purposes ruled out.
in

for deterrence,

Yigal Allon

1965 acting as Foreign Minister elaborated somewhat on

Eshkol's formulation, stating, "Israel would not be the
first to introduce nuclear weapons into the region--nor

would

it

be the second."

10

One can look at this either

as a veiled nuclear deterrence threat aimed at the Arabs
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(who were making sporadic efforts to acquire
nuclear

weapons of their own) or perhaps
fact,

i.e.,

it

is

a

statement of

that Israel could not afford to be pre-empted

in a nuclear confrontation and would have
to strike first
at

a

particular adversary.

Foreign Minister Allon's codicil points to

a

long-

term nuclear policy at the top of the Israeli leadership
that has remained stable over time.

facets to Israeli nuclear policy:

There are two main
the decision-makers'

unambiguous determination to use nuclear weapons (if the

situation required) and the public facet which

is

un-

ambiguous and deliberately vague as to the motivations and

capabilities of the nuclear program.

The whole effect is

allegedly to deter aggression via an ambiguous nuclear
stance.

An ambivalent nuclear policy that denies offi-

cially but impl i es by subtle means

a

nuclear capability

will safeguard Israel from the near total diplomatic

isolation and inevitable (and legally mandated) cut-off
of U.S. mi

1 i t

ary /economic aid that

a

publicly announced

nuclear arsenal would immediately entail.
only suspected of possessing

a

If

nuclear weapon,

Arab states need not see this as

a

Israel is
then the

blatant provocation

necessitating rapid steps to correct.

Such radical steps

might include obtaining nuclear guarantees from the
U.S.S.R., attempting radical nuclearization to match
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Israeli capabilities or preventative
warfare undertaken
expressly to eliminate the Israeli nuclear
threat.
So
long as the status of Israeli nuclear
weapons is ambiguous
and remote,

the Arabs are not tempted to enact any
of

these costly options.
Israel is, geographically speaking,

nation with
it

is

a

a

very small

proportionally small nuclear force (though

growing at

a

steady pace).

The Arab states still

potentially outnumber and outgun Jerusalem by
conventional margin.

wide

a

Although their combat performance

has been problematic in the past,

Israeli military

planners fear that the Arabs may one day find

means to

a

maximize their quantitative advantages vis-a-vis Israel.
An announced Israeli nuclear option might induce the

Arabs to acquire their own nuclear weapons in an effort
to meet and numerically surpass Israel's nuclear arsenal.

As an aside,

it was

thinking to this effect that in part

prompted the Israeli attack on the Iraqi Tamoz

I

nuclear

reactor in 1981.
Hence,

ambiguous nuclear deterrence

is

a

useful ploy

for a small nation to dissuade a hostile nearby coalition

from engaging in continuous aggression.

It

serves as

a

step back from actual nuclear deterrence as practiced by
the super -power s

.

Instead of the question being, "Will

they or won't they use 'the bomb' given sufficient provo-

cation?"

,

the question in the Near East is "Do
they or

don't they have
to use?"

U.S.

a

nuclear capability that they are willing

Ambiguity also (perhaps irrationally) allows

foreign policy makers to maintain

a

hope that since

no irrevocable step has been publicly taken
by Jerusalem

regarding nuclear weapons, some type of arrangement
can
yet be worked out

for

Israel to drop its nuclear option.

Within Israel, the strategy of ambiguity serves
vital purpose as it prevents

a

a

broad-based political de-

bate from occurring in regards to any aspect of nuclear
policy.

Since the national leadership is publicly vague

on questions of strategic doctrine and

information

is

cor-

respondingly scant, there has been very little dialogue
Israel as to whether or not nuclear weapons are

able option.

A

a

in

desir-

public nuclear weapons stance must inevit-

ably presuppose some type of open public debate as to the

efficacity of said stance.

Such an occurrence is undesir-

able to Israeli decision-makers.

Although

if

one looks at

the origins of nuclear deterrence in the U.S. A. and the

U.S.S.R.,

there is

a

conspicuous lack of public debate in

both countries regarding what was an announced policy of

deterrence.
also

a

Military censorship within Israel itself

is

potent tool on behalf of strategic ambiguity.

Ambiguity or the deliberate indeterminacy of deterrence threats is possible only because the state of Israel
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exercises

great deal of control over political and
tech-

a

nological information in regards to nuclear
policy.
actual nature of nuclear preparations has
never

The

been ex-

plicitly discussed in the Israeli news media and
parliamentary debate even over the general status of
non-

proliferation

in

the region is almost unheard of. 11

Information cont rol /censor sh ip

is

then an integral part

of maintaining not just military secrecy,

itself.
of

a

Shimon Peres (one of Israel's earliest advocates

nuclear option) summed

he said,

bomb

is

but deterrence

up succinctly in 1966 when

it

"As long as suspicion that Israel has the [atom]

deterrent

a

suspicion

is

...

enough."

in our present

Such

a

situation the

policy is not possible

without the information itself being subjected to tight

political control.

All this is easily accomplished as

the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission has been run under

military auspices since 1966.

All this makes it difficult

for foreign or domestic observers to assess Israel's

capabilities and intentions.
The actual nature of the Israeli nuclear forces

obviously
theless,

is
a

highly conjectural and speculative.

None-

secret CIA report accidentally leaked to the

public in January 1974 placed the entire arsenal at ten
to twenty "Nagasaki" class fission weapons.

13

These

would be plutonium fueled implosion type bombs with an
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average yield of no more than twenty
kilotons.

This was

the conventional wisdom until Mordechai
Vanunu,

a

technician at the Dimona complex, leaked

a

former

great deal of

information about Israeli nuclear weapons to the
London
Sunday Times in October 1986.

^

This unprecedented leak

forced the experts to drastically revise upward
the quantity and Qverall sophistication of the Israeli
nuclear arsenal.

Estimates of the total reserve were now placed as

high as 100 to 200 bombs, some of which had supposedly

been rad iologically enhanced to produce greater than ex-

pected yields,
this is so,

in

the region of 50 kilotons or

then the Israelis have

a

so.^

If

nuclear arsenal capa-

ble of both battlefield tactical uses and strategic appli-

cations.

This means that there may well be combat scen-

arios envisioned in Israel in which nuclear weapons are
used before national survival is threatened irremediably.

With an arsenal of as few as 60 to 100 weapons (the

current accepted number), counterforce scenarios that

concentrate on destroying the military forces of an
opponent.

If anything,

Israeli nuclear capabilities will

continue to grow unimpeded in the future, therefore

it

is

safe to assume that their weapons applications will become
ever more flexible.
As for delivery systems for these nuclear weapons,

Israel has sought guided missile technologies since at
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least the late 1960s.

The Israeli defense force possesses

mixed delivery system potential which includes
at least
three types of aircraft capable of carrying
nuclear

a

weapons (the Kfir, the Phanton IIE fighter bomber
and the
F-16 fighter) and the Jericho

II

missile system.

The

fighter aircraft are capable of long-range missions of
at
least 500 miles on

two-way flight.

a

Given the past effi-

ciency of the Israeli air force in conducting conventional
air operations,

it

can be assumed that these aircraft are

capable of performing counterforce nuclear strikes against

Arab targets.

The 1981 Osiraq raid served as

a

veiled

reminder to all of Israel's Arab antagonists of the pre-

cision and efficacity of Israel's aerial capabilities.
The Jericho II missile system, on the other hand,
has only

a

range of some 400 miles, but

accurate enough for

a

it

is

more than

sudden countervalue strike against

the nearer Arab states.

For even within the state of

Israel's pre-1967 borders,

the Jericho missile system can

still reach such major Arab population centers as Cairo,

Alexandria, Port Said, Amman, Damascus and Beirut.

In

addition, during the last three years, Jerusalem has

pushed the development of the Jericho II-B, an enhanced

version of the original Jericho with
miles.

^

a

range of some 900

This gives Israel complete strategic coverage

of the entire Middle East and at least
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theoretically the

,

capability to bit targets in the southernmost
portion of
the U.S.S.R.
All of this points to one fact,

this being that the

original combat mission of Jerusalem's nuclear
arsenal
has irrevocably changed.

1970s it was

a

When it began in the early

small arsenal of weapons earmarked for

a

worst case nuclear threat against supposedly victorious

Arab armies.
syndrome,

This was facetiously known as the "Samson"

i.e.

that annihilation will be brought down

upon all participants in
Israel.
of

a

future total war against

However today the quantity and sophistication

Israeli nuclear weapons are such that

tion of deterrence can be envisioned.

a

wider applica-

Clearly Israel now

has an atomic arsenal sufficient not only to deter in
last ditch" situation but also deter in

a

lesser mi 1 i t ar y-pol i t i cal confrontations.

a

number of
Yet to the

present day Israel still cloaks its ever diversifying

nuclear weapons program with the same strategy of ambi-

guity that it's been using since 1960.

whether or not

a

It

nuclear program of such

a

is

Questionable

scope can still

be effectively obscured physically and rhetorically as

time goes on.

In a

larger sense though

tionable whether Israeli security

it

is well

is

also ques-

served by

policy of such studied ambivalence and ambiguity.

a

Hence,

since the political existence of the Israeli nuclear
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arsenal

unspecified and ambiguous, then the actual
relationship of those weapons to a larger
strategic docis

trine can be said to be likewise ambiguous.
in

For example,

thee out of four of the wars Israel has fought
since

1956,

the IDF has favored

Whether or not such
Israel

s

a

a

strategy of pre-emption.

strategy has been carried over into

nuclear doctrine

is

simply not known.
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CHAPTER IV
THE ISRAELI NUCLEAR OPTION:

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SUPER-POWERS

As has been pointed out previously, both
the United

States and the Soviet Union have

fairly stable ongoing

a

interest in maintaining worldwide nuclear non-

proliferation.
it

This interest is particularly acute when

comes to the Middle East as for the last twenty five

years both nations have shared

a

strong concern that if

catalytic nuclear could occur, then more than likely
will start in the Middle East as

Arab-Israeli conflict.
justify this fear,

There are

result of

a

a

a

a

it

totalistic

number of reasons to

the frequency of interstate aggression,

the supposedly intransigent nature of the religious /ethnic

confrontation, and the relative close proximity of patron
to client corresponding to the continuing political stand-

off between those same super-powers.

In a

sense when it

comes to the Middle East the two super-powers fear

a

type

of "Sarajevo syndrome" whereby assurances given to client

allies are abused in

a

crisis to the point of super-power

involvement /confrontat ion

.

This is one of the many

reasons why the major powers do not give their regional
allies too many explicit guarantees of support.
a

nuclear dimension to

a

Moreover,

regional military crisis vastly
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complicates matters and
of

is

alleged to decrease the ability

the major powers to intervene effectively
while cor-

respondingly increasing the necessity of doing
so.

The

danger as always lies in the "irrevocable act"
inherent
in

nuclear weapons untempered by any rules of
regional

deference.

Both powers wish to prevent the radical dif-

fusion of power to their "clients" in
not have

a

a

region that does

history of stable management of power relation-

ships, yet does simultaneously contain definite interests
on the part of Moscow and Washington.
If

this is the case, why then do both the major

interested powers continually acquiesce

strategy of ambiguity?

It

is

in

the Israeli

clear that Israel's total

policy of ambiguity in the end exists at the sufferance
at

the very least of the United States which presumably

possesses detailed technical information about the real
nature of the entire Israeli nuclear program.

The Soviet

Union also possesses equally detailed intelligence about
nuclear policy and development in Israel.
It

is not only

the United States who has this capa-

bility but also as mentioned before the Soviet Union and
the Republic of France.

The French actually helped build

the Dimona nuclear complex under the terms of

agreement negotiated after the 1956 Suez War.

a

secret
The terms

of this agreement apparently called not only for the pro-
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vision of all reactor components but also
basic construction supplies and an initial supply
of uranium fuel.

Neither Israeli nor France have ever seen
fit to disclose
the actual terms of this accord.

Ambiguity would probably be demolished

if

the French

government chose to simply publish the unexpurgated
text
of the 1957 nuclear assistance pact with Israel.

option along with

a

This

detailed inventory of the equipment

transferred along with

a

chr on o logy of French involvement

with the project would public ly end any doubts as to
the

nature and extent of Israel's nuclear option.

every case, the U.S.,

the French,

Yet in

and the Soviet Union

show no real attempt is being made publicly to confront
the problem.

Why then do the major powers continually acquiesce
in

preserving Israeli nuclear ambiguity?

passively accepted more or less because

This policy is
is

it

in

the

interests of the major powers to do so as the costs

entailed in going public are extremely high.

For the

United States exposing Israel's nuclear weapons status
could only come about in conjunction with

reassessment of Israel's status as
region.

This is

a

a

a

radical

client/ally in the

move that would have potent domestic

consequences for the U.S. administration who opted for
even during

a

relatively peaceful interlude in the near
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it

east.

Moreover

would also complete the
international
Isolation of Israel, embolden
Arab ambitions and possibly
lay the ground work for
a new war.
The U.S. government
bound by law
to terminate military
assistance to
any nation that is making
overt nuclear weapons preparations.
Loss of the U.S. as a
military patron might force
Jerusalem to start making very
explicit nuclear threats
against its restive opponents,
which is the very thing
the U.S. wishes to prevent.
it

The French, one assumes,

refrain from publication of

their 1957 nuclear agreement
and/or nuclear commerce
history with Israel as this would
expose publicly the

extensive nature of French collaboration
with Israel's
nuclear weapons program.
This would tend to generate
more western critical scrutiny on
current French nuclear
19
technology dealings.
Like Israel, France is not a
party to the NPT and,

furthermore, Paris never even signed

the Partial Test Ban Treaty.

have

a

Overall France does not

very good record on non-proliferation issues
and

does not wish to highlight this difficiency

possible.

if

at all

Over the last twenty years French nuclear

development accords have been negotiated with such known

proliferation dangers

as

Iraq, Argentina,

and Pakistan.

The Russians are also reticent to publicize unduly

Israeli strategic capabilities for
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a

number of possible

reasons, despite

a

with Jerusalem.

Like the United States the Kremlin
fears

certain ammount of longstanding emnity

catalytic nuclear conflict igniting in the Middle
East
lacking a definitive peace, and hence a certain
uneasy

a

status quo must be accepted.

Exposure of the Israeli

nuclear arsenal would only disrupt the status quo and

possibly bring down on Moscow
for various

torrent of Arab requests

a

types of guarantees 21
.

This pressure would

probably come in two forms, either requests for an explicit nuclear quarantee against Israel or else

a

direct

transfer of retaliatory weapons to their territory under
some mutually suitable launch decision arrangement.

Neither option particularly appeals to the Soviet leadership as it puts the Arabs in the position of determining

Soviet policy in

a

crisis based on their interpretation

of Kremlin guarantees.

interested in playing
politics,

it

has

a

While the U.S.S.R.
a

is

always

more active role in the region's

cautious attitude towards any agree-

ments that would explicitly involve Moscow in joint
nuclear decision making.

Like the United States,

Soviets wish to be seen as an arbiter and
whom the Arabs are dependent.

22

a

the

patron upon

A public exposure of

Israel quite simply complicates diplomatic matters in

ways that would not serve the interests of the U.S.S.R.
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CHAPTER V
ISRAELI NUCLEAR WEAPONS:

PARTICULAR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA

In

American foreign policy there

is

a

fundamental

saliency problem with regards to specific nations who
elect to pursue

countries
U.S.

a

nuclear option.

nuclear development

is

Over time, certain

more important to the

than that same development is at other times.

For

this case Israeli nuclear development was of higher sali-

ency for the U.S. Government during the 1961-1968 period
than

it

was in 1971-1977.

High saliency means that U.S.

decision makers regarded the Israeli acquisition of nuclear weapons to be detrimental to both the security inter

ests of the United States and Israel.

Efforts therefore

large and small were directed towards dissuading Tel Aviv
to abandon its nuclear weapons ambitions.

Yet ten years

later this issue is virtually abandoned by

a

U.S. administration with

a

differing concept of what U.S.

security interests are in the region.
then comprised of

a

different

Low saliency is

policy of benign neglect, wherein the

patron studiously ignores the nuclear development of an
ally in favor of other allegedly more important issues.
At the same time the Israelis via

gems were able to maintain

a

a

number of strata

general commitment to
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a

.

nuclear option which by 1969 became

weapons arsenal.
content.

a

de facto nuclear

Their policy never changed in its

The means to produce

a

nuclear weapon had to be

obtained regardless of U.S. desires to the
contrary.
The saliency question is also linked to

larger but

a

relevant bi-dimensionality in U.S. Middle Eastern
policy.
This means that Washington's approach travels along
two

mutually exclusive axes.

The first option is

a

kind of

"top-down" approach that asserts that the U.S. ought to
try for
in

a

successful regional peace conference that would

turn lead to

issues.

If

a

general settlement of the outstanding

this is the case then some of the relevant

issues would include Israel's right to exist being

accepted by all parties,

the case of the Palestinians,

secure borders and possibly even conventional arms control.

This method attempts to settle the whole dilemma

of power and peace

Once

a

in

the region in one "package deal."

peace arrangement is found and implemented then

a

non-proliferation policy can be worked out to everyones'
sat isf action

This is

a

method that defines nuclear non-

proliferation (along with several other questions) as
non-pressing secondary issue that
not immediately so.
it

In

is

of

a

importance but

its approach to non-proliferation

bears some resemblance to the Israeli formulation of
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the 1960s that insisted that nuclear
non-proliferation

can only be successfully implemented
if there are conditions of regional pe ace--this the
Middle East does not

have.

2 3

Hence

a

general peace must precede any hope of

a

Middle Eastern arrangement over nuclear
non-proliferation
issues.

Implicitly

it

treats the entire question of

regional non-proliferation as

non-abstractable issue

a

from the "whole problem" of the Middle East.
in

this approach are clear:

The flaws

first that the diplomatic

problems of the region can be conceptualized into

a

single

dilemma that all parties would have an equal interest
resolving.

Secondly that even

an Arab-Israeli settlement
is

is

in

this single concept of

if

possible to generate there

no guarantee of success hence no resolution of the

proliferation question.
The other diametrically opposing view contends that
a

in

general and multilateral peace arrangement
the Middle East and that

strategy

is

necessary.

a

This option calls for diplomatic
a

series of select pri-

mary and secondary issues which over time
a

impossible

type of piecemeal bottom-up

initiative to be concentrated on

can lead "upward" to

is

regional peace.

if

successful

This approach

views middle eastern regional peace and security as

a

goal that can only be achieved by an aggregate of lesser

evolutionary steps--wi thin which nuclear non-proliferation
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.

equally valued along side other
potential areas of
content ion
IS

The flaw in the bottom-up approach
is that

it

takes

great deal of time and effort on the part
of all participants.
Success as in any diplomatic venture

a

is not

assured and if it is achieved

it

may not commensurate

with the effort expended.

Since

of diplomatic resources

necessary, results may not be

apparent for

a

is

a

long term commitment

long time, and it is important then that

there be some measure of domestic consensus on the part
of

the national actors in order to preserve continuity

despite leadership changes.

Without this domestic con-

sensus on the part of the national actors the bottom-up

approach cannot succeed.
One of the main reasons why Israel has been able to

proceed relatively uninhibited with its nuclear program
is

due to the slow changes in the "roles" played by the

client and the patron.

Israel's ability to resist "per-

suasion" on the part of the United States

is

in part

linked to the rising strength of the political tie to the
U.S.

in

the aftermath of the 1967 Six Day War.

24

It was

after that point that Israel began to come under some

pressure from Western democracies to make

a

deal however

unfavorable over the occupied territories with the Arabs.
Having been branded an aggressor and suffered much invec-
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.

tive in the U.N.,

Israel began to seek out new and
more

reliable allies.

Previous to the 1967 war Israel could

count on military suppliers like France
and Great Britain,
but in the post Six-Day environment it
was clear to Prime

Minister Levi Eshkol and others in the Israeli
leadership
that more reliable patrons had to be
cultivated.

DeGaulle was particularly committed to

a

Charles

more "even-

handed" Middle Eastern policy after 1967 thus the
traditional assurance of French military aid was no longer

reliable
As such,

it

became vitally important for Israel to

develop some sort of

a

military-political understanding

with Washington --especially after the 1967 Six Day War.

Towards this end, the Israeli government mobilized

a

number of diplomatic and political resources within the

United States in order to assure at the very least
reliable military supplies.

Over time what the Eshkol-

Meir governments sought to do was to build up diplomatic

leverage in Washington in order to safeguard the military

security of Israel. 25
period,

Accordingly,

in

the 1967 to 1970

Israel stressed the dangers of Soviet penetration

into the region,

the strategic potential of Israel as

a

regional ally and quietly the inevitability of the nuclear

option

if

Tel Aviv was politically abandoned.

themes (and

a

number of others),

90

Using these

Israel slowly built up

a

strong political tie with Washington on
the legislative,

executive and public levels that made
articulate
In

at

a

it

difficult to

policy of coercion or "strong persuasion."

short,

attempting to coerce Israel via the threat

least of arms transfers now held definite
costs both

domestic and foreign for U.S. decision-makers as the
1960s progressed.

The strengthening of the political tie

to the United States made it possible for

Israel to resist

coercive diplomacy over the issue of nuclear development.
At

the same time the role change that the U.S.

in

the 1960s from that of

arbitrator to that of

a

a

underwent

sympathetic but detached

defacto military patron made

it

very difficult correspondingly for the United States to

apply coercive pressure on Israel with military supplies
at

least.

Policy considerations contemplated by the U.S.

were constrained by the subtle changes in its role as

a

major power with regional interests.
In

this case,

diplomacy

is

in

the power to thwart U.S. anti-nuclear

part

a

function of the strength of the

political tie to the patron state at least in terms of
the supply of military material.

This is then

a

method

for taking advantage of the unstable saliency of the

nuclear issue in six different U.S. administrations.
This "technique" is all the more effective if one's own

policy in this case of study nuclear development
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is

of

.

stable saliency through

a

succession of cabinets.

As

shall be seen, the question of
proliferation in the Middle
East for the United States in
turn depends on the definition of regional interests impended
in the two-tiered
approach:
top-down vs. bottom-up.
It is important to
repeat that if U.S. policy has evolved
over the past
twenty-five years it still has not achieved
the goal of
inducing Israeli forbearance in regards
to nuclear

weapons
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CHAPTER VI
IhE HISIORIC CONTEXT:

in May ot

1937,

an assessment

Israeli Prime Minister David
Ben

Gurion in Che aftermath of the
abortive Suez War sought
an explicit security guarantee
from his European supporters, France and England.
He sent
one of his most

trusted associates,

the young Shimon Peres,

to Paris in

an effort to convince Guy Monnet
to sponsor Tel Aviv's

memoersnip in NATO. Zb

As America was still holding to

an embargo on sophisticated weaponry
sales to Israel.
Ine embargo left Israel embittered
and somewhat suspi-

cious of Eisenhower's diplomacy.

Ben Gurion believed

that this type of American diplomacy would embolden
Arab

adventurism.

The attempt to get an explicit security

guarantee failed, although after the Suez War, Britain,
trance and the U.S. made

a

vague pledge to keep the

waterways of Eilat on the Red Sea open for all traffic.

Clearly,

if

Israel was to survive,

it needed

military patrons to deal with the danger posed by unreconciled Arab states.

The late 1930s and early 19b0s

proved to be tne high point in Fr ench- Israe 1 i diplomatic

cooperation.

French military involvement in Algeria left

Paris diplomatically isolated in the region, while Israel

required

a

reliaDle military supplier.
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1

it was

in iate 1957 that

Israel and France began

highly secret discussions over the possible
sale of
French nuclear reactor to the Israelis. 26
Shimon

a

Feres and Prime Minister Ben Gurion were the
most

vocal advocates of

a

nuclear option (however vague)

that might at least partially replace a Western
security alliance.

trance, on the other hand, amidst the

turmoil of Suez, Algeria, and tbe transition to the
fifth Republic, had decided that nuclear weapons were

necessary to playing an independent part internationally. 29

The sale of

Israel was part of

a

a

nuclear reactor to

French attempt inexpensively to

build up Tel Aviv's potential as

power with

a

Western orientation.

a

secure regional

The secrecy and the

rapidity with which the deal was concluded was necessary so as to prevent any American fore-knowledge of
this project.

deal,

it was

possible.

If

Washington had any intimation of the

sure to try to abort it as soon as

The Fisennower administration saw the U.S.

as an arbitration-minded power in the region,

snould be approachable by all parties.

j (j

nuclear reactor would not be in the U.S.
these circumstances.
tial,

one that

An Israeli

interest under

The reactor itself was

a

substan-

24 megawatt lignt-water type, which was to be under

the complete control of Israel.
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3

The cost was to be

$75 million for the whole complex,

in which

neither

France nor the IAEA would have
inspection privileges. 32
Through this reactor, given time,
Israel
could

produce an arsenal of nuclear weapons
fueled either with
cheap plutonium 239 or with enriched
uranium 238.
Both
of

these options would be achievable as the
requisite

technology was included in the deal. 33

Meanwhile,

Prime Minister Ben Gurion was to continue the
search for

either an explicit security guarantee or else
an assured

supplier of military material.
the Israeli

Despite polite rebuffs,

leadership continued to center its hopes on

some type of explicit security arrangement with the

United States regard ng less of American behavior during
i

the Suez crisis.

Ben Gurion also thought that

a

nuclear

capability might give Israel some much-needed nuclear
leverage in Washington. 34

t

.

It was not

until 1960 that Israel experienced any

international repercussions about the Dimona nuclear
power complex.

During that summer French President

DeGaulle, under pressure from anti-Israeli elements in
his own energy bureaucracy,

called on the Israelis to

revamp radically their nuclear program.
the sudden fear that the reactor deal was
the region's stability.

This was out of
a

danger to

Specifically, what DeGaulle

wanted was that the Dimona reactor be made public, that
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the AEA supervision be assured,

and further that Israel

find another supplier of uranium ore. 36

Taken together,

this spelled disaster for the Israeli
nuclear program.

Any one point of DeGaulle's request would
be sufficient
to derail the prospect of unsafeguarded
nuclear develop-

ment in Israel.

Ben Gurion (still the Israeli Prime

Minister) verbally promised DeGaulle

the summer of

in

1960 that Dimona would not be used to produce nuclear

weapons. 37

„
He

also arranged to have Shimon Peres sent

to Paris to try and

smooth over any diplomatic difficul-

ties that arose out of the secret nuclear agreement. 36

Peres had his work cut out for him,

for while

DeGaulle was inclined to take Een Gurion's assurances at
face value, he also wanted certain guarantees from Israel
that France's magnanimity would not be abused.
ingly,

by September Israel agreed to

gram with the French.

First,

a

Accord-

three-point pro-

Israel would continue to

build the reactor with decreasing French participation.
In

return, France would drop its demand for international

inspection of the reactor once

it

was completed.

Sec-

ondly, French companies linked with the construction of
the reactor would continue to supply all of the equipment

already ordered.

Israel presumably would be willing to

assume 100 percent of the financial risk immediately to

facilitate this move.

Thirdly,

46

that by the fall of 1960

David Ben Gurion would promise to make

public announce-

a

ment of the Dimona reactor's existence and also to
dis-

close the exact nature of the research projects therein
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fact, with only one exception

*

(that being

a

pledge to publicly announce the reactor's existence),
Peres and Ben Gurion managed to preserve virtually all
the Israeli prerequisites in this matter.

Presumably

France also promised to provide start-up nuclear fuel
for the reactor once it was completed.
to run the reactor continuously

own uranium supplies.

Other than that,

Israel had to secure its

This is important, as

is

it

through the irradiation and processing of spent uranium
fuel rods that weapons-grade plutonium 239 is obtained.
In effect,

by foregoing the fuel supplier relationship

and the stringent safeguards system that goes with it,

France gave Israel

(a

nation rich enough in low-grade

phosphate uranium to provide enough fuel for Dimona)
carte blanche to utilize its nuclear potential for

military purposes.
Out of this,

the Monnet/La France/DeGaulle govern-

ments helped to cement

a

diplomatic marriage of conveni-

ence with the only nation in the region willing to hack

French foreign policy.

In a more

ephemeral sense though,

provision of atomic resources to an ally, even
porary one, was

a

a

tem-

sign of French major power status.

To

^

DeGaulle personally,
order of

it was

initially something on the

defiance of the United States.

a

In his mind

France was willing to ally itself with an
embattled

democracy that Washington kept at arm's length.

^

In

addition, nuclear weapons for Israel would provide
cheap

deterrence of General Nasser's Egypt, which was after
the Suez crisis

a

major diplomatic opponent of French

Algerian policy.^

Negotiations over the announcement of Dimona's
existence were still going on
in

a

in

December of 1960 when

closed session of the U.S. Joint Congressional Com-

mittee on Atomic Energy, the State Department announced
that

nuclear reactor was being constructed in Israel's

a

Negev Desert.

This caught the French and the Israelis

by surpr i se-- the Israeli

ambassador to the U.S.

initially

offered the Secretary of State the explanation that

Dimona was in fact
Under

a

a

sophisticated textile works.

A2

great deal of pressure, David Ben Gurion was

forced to publicly admit that Israel was indeed con-

structing

a

nuclear facility, but when presented with

a

detailed plan to verify the plant's peaceful use by the
Americans, he would only reiterate the reactor's exclusively civilian character.

Despite great interest on the part of the waning

Eisenhower administration, the matter lay fallow for
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almost four months, until Prime
Minister Gurion and
President Kennedy met in New York in
March 1961. 44
This "summit" temporarily mollified
the U.S.A. as to
Israel's intentions in the field of
nuclear energy.

Previous to this meeting, U.S. scientists
had informally
inspected the Dimona site and in a secret
report to the

President stated that as yet the reactor
was designed for
peaceful purposes only.
Between this and Ben Gurion's

verbal assurance to Kennedy that Israel had no
intention
of manufacturing nuclear weapons,

the matter was laid to

an uneasy rest. A5

This indicates,

though,

an early and strong U.S.

interest in the Israeli nuclear program across two poli-

tically differing administrations.

President Kennedy's

decision to accept Prime Minister Ben Gurion's explanation of the reactor's purpose along with the informal

assessment of the unfinished nuclear complex,

though,

meant that the U.S., rather than pressing the issue
before capabilities coalesced, elected to adopt
and see" policy.

In

"wait

This was probably due to Washington's

decision to emphasize other political problems
region.

a

the short run,

in

the

the State Department believed

non-proliferation (though undeniably of great interest
to the Administration)

of nuclear weapons was not an

immediate problem in the Middle East.

A9

Other problems,

^

such as the war in South Yemen
and the ongoing question
of refugees, took precedence.
Unfortunately, adopting a
"wait and see" approach tends to favor
the nascent

strategy of ambiguity favored by Israel.
States probably lost here

The United

priceless opportunity to

a

stop the project before the reactor itself
was scheduled
to be completed

on-line,

in

1964.

Once the Dimona complex was

the problem was not a question of what
might

happen, but one of what

j_s

happening in

facility the

a

more than unusually suspicious Israelis were very
sensitive about.

In

this,

Kennedy was yet adhering to the

Eisenhower formula of high interest but severe restraint
in

dealing with all aspects of Israeli policy.
At this same March 30 meeting,

Prime Minister Ben

Gurion's request for sophisticated anti-aircraft "Hawk"

missiles was considered with some interest by Kennedy.
The President in turn promised to "look into" the question of Israeli air defense. 46
a

This sale represented

strong break with the tradition of restraint in supply-

ing advanced arms to Israel.

that

a

Kennedy probably thought

promise to reconsider this relationship was

minor concession in return for

a

no nuclear weapons

pledge and informal inspections of Dimona
In

fact,

a

.

the Hawk missile deal would come back to

haunt succeeding U.S. administrations as

50

a

symbol of the

changing role the U.S. plays regionally
and specifically
the first step in a long trade-off
of U.S. conventional
military supplies in return for no Israeli
public reli-

ance on nuclear weapons.

escapable.
to force

Had some strong diplomatic efforts been
made

Israel to adhere to

the IAEA,

a

safeguards agreement with

possibly the U.S. could have avoided an ongoing

ar ms-based

effect,

The conclusion here is in-

identification with the Israeli cause.

In

the government opted to "act" on its interest in

non-proliferation by doing nothing except waiting.
In

the interim,

though,

President Kennedy did

realize that Israel's nuclear ambitions were strongly
linked to its security dilemma.

His formulation took on

very explicit dimensions as in December of 1962,

course of

in

the

meeting with Foreign Minister Golda Meir, the

a

President verbally declared that in case of invasion, the
U.S. would "come to the support" of Israel.

^

Though

obviously never publicly announced, this was apparently
an attempt

to boost

Israel's confidence in the U.S. so

that the nuclear option would appear less tempting to

Tel Aviv.
It

is

possible that Kennedy believed that the whole

question of

a

nuclear option for Israel could be dis-

missed quietly if the security guarantee could be given
to Tel Aviv.

The CIA in March of 1963 compiled the first
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of several estimates of Israel's
nuclear capability.

The report concluded that while
Israel was five to ten
years away from acquiring nuclear weapons,
the political
effects of such an event would be highly
detrimental to
U.S.

interests in the region.

^

The fear was that

a

nuclear armed Israel would tend to polarize
the regional
actors into Soviet-backed and Western-backed
surrogates,
thus necessitating intimate super-power
involvement in
the politics of the region. 50

Kennedy at all costs

wanted to avoid having the Middle East become
for East-West confrontation,

but

a

new point

Israel's nuclear

if

potential constrained the U.S. old role of arbitrator,
then

a

possible security guarantee contrariwise could

provoke similar Soviet pledges to the Arab states.

Nonetheless

,

Kennedy went so far as to assure Israel's

new Prime Minister Levin Eshkol in

a

confidential letter

in

October of 1963 that Israel could rely on U.S. support

in

a

military crisis.

5 ^

This pledge was never made

public and the letter itself did not surface until 1969.

Unfortunately, whatever Kennedy had

in

mind was never

followed up on, as he was assassinated not more than

month later.
legacy,

This,

then,

a

was Kennedy's diplomatic

that he was willing to break with tradition and

supply sophisticated weapons to Israel, and further that
he was willing to make

a

seemingly secret security pledge

52

to Tel Aviv.

For Israel,

it was

clear that the Dimona

reactor held out the potential previously
unobtainable
political leverage potential in Washington,
D.C.

Lyndon

Johnson came to the White House having

B.

absorbed much of the Kennedy administration's
high

saliency thinking about nuclear non-proliferation.

He

was also pledged to expedite the Hawk
anti-aircraft

missile sale that Kennedy had finally approved
spring of 1963.

in

the

Hence President Johnson was in some

sense committed to the contradictory policy, one of
high
tech conventional arms sales to

a

nation previously not

strictly considered to be an ally, which was experimenting with nuclear weapons technology.
a

The Hawk deal and

request for air fighters, however, was not completed

as of January

quite

a

1964.

If

fait accompli,

as coun t er

- 1

a

new arms relationship was not

then these requests could be used

ever age with which to press for concessions

on Israel's nuclear option.
In June of

paid

a

1964,

Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol

formal state visit to the White House (the first

visit of its kind for an Israeli statesman).

President

Johnson at this meeting strongly expressed his opposition
to

the deployment of nuclear weapons in the region by

Israel.

Eshkol,

in

turn,

pressed Israel's need for

tanks, military material and "an American declaration of

53

support

m

case [Israel] was attacked." 52

To justify

this, Eshkol and his foreign
affairs advisor, Shimon
Peres raised the spectre of Soviet
penetration of the
region.
President Johnson was sympathetic to
Israeli

military requirements.

At the same time,

however, he

wanted some type of "guarantee" from
Eshkol that Israel
would not pursue a nuclear option.
In

fact,

what the President got was

a

verbal promise

to limit production of weapons grade
nuclear material,

especially with regard to plutonium 239. 53
ally,

Addition-

Eshkol reaffirmed the informal American inspection

system of the Dimona nuclear complex.

In

the past,

Prime

Minister Ben Gurion refused to consider regular visits
on
anything else than an ad hoc basis, but under Levi Eshkol
this was

a

concession the Israeli Cabinet was only too

ready to make.
to power

in

Levi Eshkol and Golda Meir had come

1964 with the idea that Israel's conventional

forces were more than adequate to secure its interests
in the region.

However,

the Israeli

leadership realized

that through the Dimona project they had the means to

bargain with the U.S. for the weapons systems that the
Israeli military required to maintain credible conven-

tional forces.

Therefore, through these judicious con-

cessions the Israelis acquired the military supplies they
needed, yet at the same time the Dimona complex remained
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^

viable both as

future bargaining chip and

a

potential

a

source of nuclear weapons.

Publicly at this June meeting, Eshkol
enunciated
for

the first time the Israeli

proliferation in the Near East:

formula for preventing

"Israel will not be the

first nation to introduce nuclear weapons
into the Middle

East.

This was, over time,

the standard policy refrain

whenever questions arose about Israeli acquisition
of
nuclear weapons.

Down through the years,

it

has become

the only policy response Israeli decision-makers
will

give (usually) whenever the question

is

brought up.

Levi Eshkol himself was considered to be

a

nuclear issue.

is

This statement, however,

dove on the

sufficiently

vague as to the definition of the first nation and the
term "introduce."

The Meir-Eshkol faction of the cabinet

apparently wished to appease the nuclear hawk s with

a

diplomatically vague formula while emphasizing American
political support and conventional arms supplies.
Levi Eshkol fundamentally sought

commitment to the regional status quo.

a

S

f)

de facto American
In

turn,

this was

made possible because of the Dimona reactor's potential
as

a

future source of nuclear weapons.

A nuclear

reactor

program that did not accept any non-proliferation safeguards (no matter what use the Israelis put

meant political leverage over Washington.
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it

towards)

Clearly,

the

reactor and the policy potential

it

represented was

instrumental in influencing the Kennedy
and Johnson
administrations toward a reassessment of
the politicalmilitary commitment to Israel's survival.
American
interest in regional non-proliferation
meant that Israel
could use this issue in the case of
their nuclear reactor
to obtain certain political
concessions, setting a quiet
but clear precedent.

President Johnson acquiesced
tion of the situation.

in

the Israeli

formula-

Since no minutes of his meetings

with Prime Minister Eshkol have as yet been
declassified,
one can only surmise that L.B.J. and the State
Department

believed that they extracted considerable concessions
from Israel.

Possibly the U.S. felt that pushing Israel

too far on the reactor would render them intractable and

belligerent in other policy areas.
to note that

1964 was

a

It

is

also important

Presidential election year and

Johnson probably did not wish to appear anti-Israeli
over an issue that as yet the American public thought

unimportant.

At the time of the June summit,

and Soviet delegations to the

e

the U.S.

igh t een-na t i on disarmament

conference were just beginning talks over

a

proposed

multilateral non-proliferation treaty--Johnson thought
that with vigilant watching,

deferred until

a

the whole issue might be

draft treaty was ready for signature.
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Meanwhile,

Israeli confidence in America's
support had

to build up against the day
that Tel Aviv could be

persuaded to divest itself of its nuclear
potential via
the nascent non-proliferation treaty.
Or so went some of the conventional
thinking in

Washington, circa 1964.

Here again,

tion lost an opportunity to make

the U.S.

administra-

strong case against

a

regional non-proliferation and perhaps to end
for good
the possibility of Israeli nuclear weapons.

By accepting

Levi Eshkol's non-proliferation formulation and
promises

regarding reactor inspections, Lyndon Johnson committed
the United States to

dove

s

dilemma

in

a

type of "dove's dilemma."

The

this case being the U.S. government's

tacit provision of conventional arms to bolster Israel's

security in return for Jerusalem's non-reliance on an
explicit nuclear option.
of

the region

is

The problem is that the peace

more often than not immediately threat-

ened by conventional warfare than
In

it

is

by nuclear bombs.

short, with only transient political promises over

the nuclear option,

Johnson was locked into maintaining

Israel's conventional deterrent as
Tel Aviv's reliance on
then,

a

a

means of preventing

nuclear deterrent.

In a

Levi Eshkol got most of what he came for,

a

sense,

public

commitment by the U.S. to the "territorial integrity of
all Middle Eastern countries" and
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a

new arms relationship

symbolized by the Hawk deal and the
sale of 50 Skybawk
fighters.
On the other hand, Eshkol
did not get an

explicit promise of support in

a

military crisis that

President Kennedy was considering.

In

this matter,

Johnson remained very cautious.
At the time of the full activation of
the Dimona

reactor in 1965, the Israeli cabinet was dominated
by

"nuclear doves."

Eshkol, Meir and Yigal Allon wished to

keep the nuclear option as
time being.

quiet possibility for the

a

They tended to see Israel's then-dominant

security dilemma as primarily

a

addressed by traditional means.

conventional one best
At no time in the nego-

tiations with L.B.J. did the Israelis actually concede

anything truly substantive on the nuclear question.
Eshkol and company found

a

way to minimally satisfy

Washington's concern for non-pr ol i f era t ion-- tha t
stress the conventional threat while permitting
of U.S.

inspection of the Dimona facility.

is,
a

type

Informal

inspections were an easy concession, as the reactor
itself would not be on-line for another year and all the

technical problems therein not worked out for at least
another year after that.
This,

then, was the status quo on nuclear matters

from 1964 to 1968.

Israel had successfully dodged the

issue while the U.S. opted to bide its time until it
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could act in concert with other nations
on

proliferation treaty.

non-

a

By the time the Six-Day War was

concluded in June 1967, however,

Israeli decision-makers

were quietly disillusioned over any hope
of

security guarantee from the West.

a

realistic

This particular con-

flict demonstrated quite plainly to Tel
Aviv that the

pledges of the U.S., Britain and France to even
keep the
Gulf of Aquaba open to Israeli shipping could not
be

relied upon.

If

trusted to meet

a

the major powers could not be

relatively small commitment as this,

how could they ever be relied upon to guarantee Israel's

national sovereignty?
The Six-Day War in

a

sense was both victory and

defeat for Israel, with potent consequences for the
future of its nuclear option in both cases.
the war was

a

As victory,

military triumph over the numerically

superior Arab forces.

Seizure of the West Bank, Gaza

Strip and Golan Heights did mean defensible borders for
Israel in terms of now possessing
in a

future war.

However,

a

this was

territorial buffer
a

defeat in the sense

that Western guarantees and military supplies were now

seen as unreliable and that Israel would have to depend

upon its own political ingenuity to ensure its own survival.

To make matters worse,

the U.S.A.

had imposed an

arms embargo on all combatants in the Six-Day War,
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^

leaving Israel without its main military
supplier in the
^
5
tense post-war environment.
5

A conventional arms relationship
with the United

States as being somewhat tenuous, this
strengthened the
bond of pro-nuclear advocates within and
without the
Cabinet, such as Moshe Dayan or Shimon Peres.

With

this in mind, Levi Eshkol dispatched in early
1968

Yitzak Rabin to the embassy in Washington with the
top

priority to restore economic and military assistance for
Israel.

forge

a
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In part,

in order

to do this Israel had

to

stronger political link with the United States.

This Rabin set out to do, creating strong links to different Jewi sh-Amer ican groups and lobbying Congress with

more persistence than his predecessor.

In addition,

Rabin went to some lengths to cultivate supporters in
the Pentagon as

a

means of bypassing what he thought

were pro-Arab elements in the State Department
The goal here is self-evident.
intent on preserving
secret,
(and

a

a

.

Israel, while

nuclear option as an ambiguous

preferred to have

a

strong conventional force

consistent super-power patron) rather than dis-

rupting the regional status quo any further with
nuclear posture.
and the U.S.,

a

public

Having been rebuffed earlier by NATO

the desire for

a

dissipated in Israel somewhat.
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security guarantee had
It

had been replaced,

1

though, with

a

more practical desire for an
assured

source of military and economic
largesse.
Here, one can see

subtle transition occurring in

a

U.S. -Israeli relations.

Israel went from

an explicitly military guarantee
of

a

desire for

its security to

a

more flexible goal of general political
support and
steady military supplies.
The latter policy goal (if
implemented correctly) preserves the greater
degree of
Israeli political independence.
Apparently an overt

military guarantee contains costs to Israeli
freedom of
action.

Obviously,

the U.S. government was willing

(if

reluctantly) to become Israel's main military supplier
if

and

forestalled any Israeli push for

it
if

it

a

formal alliance

meant political leverage over Tel Aviv.

In Washington,

though,

it

was evident that the

administration had new in f orma tion and priorities to act
upon.

In

January of 1968, CIA Director Richard Helms

personally briefed President Johnson on the extent of
the Israeli nuclear weapons program.

The conclusion of

the report he gave asserted that if Israel did not

already have nuclear weapons,

"several months." 6

it

would obtain them within

The situation had now evolved from

nuclear potential to nuclear reality.
dent Johnson reacted in

a

Typically, Presi-

contradictory fashion.

On the

one hand, he ordered Helms not to reveal any aspect of
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“

this report to any other
member of the government:
“Don
tell anyone else about this,
not even Dean Rusk
or Robert MacNamara. b2
This was, in all likelihood,
an attempt to temporarily defer
the problem, Johnson

being in the midst of the post-Tet
Offensive political
crisis.
President Johnson had a somewhat
“improvisational" style when it came to certain
aspects of national
security policy. Making and putting a
“gag order" on
the CIA report is entirely consistent
with a possible
desire to put this turn of events to
some positive use.

Obviously at some point between the Six-Day
War and
the new year,

the Israeli government had gone back on

its verbal promise to limit operations
at Dimona.

at

the same time,

Yet

the informal inspections the U.S. was

conducting were insistent that no military use was being
made of the reactor.

More interestingly though, at the

end or January Johnson quietly rescinded the seven-month

arms embargo against Israel.

This allowed Jerusalem to

begin placing much-needed orders for military equipment

with American companies.

It

is

very likely that Helms'

report and the possibility it held out of

a

defiant

nuclear armed Israel influenced the President's decision
(along with more mundane political considerations,

19bd

being an election year) beyond this Johnson did little
else to deal with the situation.

b2
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Nonetheless

,

negotiations were going forward to
on

final draft of the nuclear
non-proliferation treaty.
Given the past "tractability" of the
Israeli leadership
on the nuclear issue (although they
were never severely
pressed on it;, Johnson believed he could
convince
a

Jerusalem to accede to the treaty, his main
lever being
the expanding military supply relationship
with
Israel.

Thus,

rescinding the embargo may have helped set the

stage for

a

future confrontation that would require

signature on the MPT in return for

a

a

conventional arms

supply
by mid-spring the U.S.

and the Soviet Union had

gotten full assent fr om the Eighteen Nation D i sarmamen
Coterence on the draft of the Non-Proliferation Treaty
and had gone on to present it to the U.N. General

Assembly for approval.

After much discussion,

the

Israeli delegation voted in favor of the original draft
as presented on June 4,

19bd.°^

Israel leveled at the treaty,

The criticism that

though, concerned the lack

of effective security provisions to non-nuclear signa-

tories of the treaty.

bZ+

The matter that especially

disturbed the Israelis revolved around the lack of

a

coDimitment by the nuclear weapons states to refrain from

threatening the use of said weapons against non-nuclear

b3
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weapons states. 65

The Arab states clearly were
not

going to universally accede to the
treaty (Libya, Egypt,
and Iraq initially refused to
sign) nor were
all the

nuclear weapons states, as Red China
and France both
declined to sign the NPT 66
As Israel considered itself

a

non-nuclear weapons

state in 1968 the implication is clear
that accession to
the treaty (while encouraged by Israel
in the general
sense) would not serve the security interests
of the

Israeli state at that time.
that

Israel had

a

This is

a

nuclear option that would be nullified

without adequate security compensation
the treaty.

passive indication

if

Israel signed

The regional security dilemma being ex-

tremely acute, accession to the treaty represented

decrease in Israel's ability to defend itself.
together,

the arguments

a

Taken

implied that unless the treaty

could address the security needs of "small nations"
Israel would not sign the agreement on the grounds that
it

was not in its long term interests to do so.

If U.S.

pledges to safeguard the straits of Tiran were unreliable,

then Israel's faith in any multilateral arrange-

ments couldn't be great.

For that matter,

the security

pledge in the treaty that all nuclear weapons states

ascribe to

is

extremely vague.

Basically,

the U.S.,

U.K., and the U.S.S.R. pledge to "invoke U.N. collective

64

security" in cases were nuclear
aggression is involved
against non-nuclear weapons states. b/
Neither the U.S.
nor the Soviet Union wished
to complicate their already

intricate alLiance structure with
possible contradictory
promises to oppose nuclear aggression.
Since the U.N.
collective security guarantees are
ambivalently worded,
the super-powers need not fear
being called upon to
rescue, say, Iraq or Libya from
Israeli nuclear threats.
Israel was a special case as at least
one of the

NPi

s

ties.

guarantors had definite knowledge of its
capabiliAside from France/Red Cnina, of all the
nations

that opted to refuse signature,

nuclear weapons status.

Israel was the closest to

The Israeli delegate to the gen-

eral assembly made it clear as possible when
he said in

May of lSbd: "we cannot be sure of the dangers that
confront us in the future ." 00 Israel never formally
rejected
the NPT,
is

electing instead to reiterate that the treaty

still "being studied

repeated Levi Lshkol

s

." 09

Over that summer Israel

formulation that the region was

in greater need of coventional rather

control.

than nuclear arms

Tne delegation also expressed the hope that the

September conference of non nuclear weapons states could

correct the treaty's flaws.

This conference though could

not convince the U.S. and the Soviet Union to rewrite

certain provisions of the NPT and thus disbanded.

bb

inis proved to be a useful
cover to deflect ques-

tions about Israel's nuclear
ambitions but it also
expressed the notion that nuclear
arms control could
only follow a conventional arms
agreement.
At this
point Israel had no regional
nuclear armed antagonists
and could afford to define the
issue as part of a larger

diplomatic problem. 70
The

iNPi

though was signed by most of the Arab
states

during the summer of 196b with intensely
anti Israeli
disclaimers and reservations appended to
their signatures.

71

in the minds of Moshe Dayan,

tne Prime Minister,

it was

Golda Meir and

wiser and simpler to decline

immediate signature while reaffirming that Israel
would
never he the “first" to introduce nuclear weapons
into
tne region.

Certainly,

this was more honest than the

Arab states who desired only to isolate Israel diplo-

matically while expanding their nuclear development under
IAEA auspices.

In the end

if

an Arab state saw fit to

accede to the treaty it was only
Israel.

indicated

if
a

a

ploy to isolate

another Arab state refused to sign,

then it

passive intention to develop nuclear weapons.

This was the consensus at the decision making level in
Israel which critically weakened the impetus to sign the
NPT.

This view easily carried the day within Israel as

bt>

there was very little domestic or
parliamentary debate
over the NPT in 1968.

Regardless, the Johnson administration
was publicly
committed to non-proliferation and here
at

device to ensure

a

non-nuclear Israel.

last was the

In January of

1968 as soon as the arms embargo was
lifted the Israeli

Ministry of Defense placed an order for fifty
Phantom
II-E fighter bombers with the Pentagon.

The Israeli air

force had been worried since the conclusion
of the Six

Day War that Arab air capabilities were being
upgraded
to

the point of being

a

regional pre-dominance.

serious challenge to the IAF's

Much had been made of this pro-

posed sale in Congress; regardless Israel did need the

planes even though the administration was very dilatory
about finalizing the sale.
In October of

1968,

after lengthy secret talks with

the Russians about the possibility of bilaterally cur-

tailing arms sales to respective client states in the

region the U.S. administration finally approved the

Phantom

II

deal.

72

Previous to this decision there

had been some discussion within the bureaucracy about

trying to make the Phantom sale contingent on either
Israeli concessions over the occupied territories or
else an Israeli signature on the NPT.

However due to

the rejection of the "Johnson peace plan" of 1967 by

67

1

both the Arabs and Israelis it
was felt that forcing
occupied territory concessions out
of Israel without an
accepted peace framework would be a
fruitless pursuit. 73

Although President Johnson had publicly
announced approval of the Phantom deal on October
9th

(nonetheless,

the Israelis believed this was an
electoral ploy to

bolster the prospects of the presidential
candidacy of
Hubert Humphrey), '
Israeli ambassador Yitzhak Rabin
was secretly called to the Pentagon on
October 22nd to

discuss the deal in its final form.
of Defense for

made

it

Here Undersecretary

international security affairs Paul Warnke

plain that in return for the fifty Phanton

II

jets Israel needed so badly the United States expected

Israel to sign the non-proliferation treaty. 73

acteristically Rabin made clear his per sona
to any such move on

the part of

Char-

opposition

Israel, he went on to

make the appropriate diplomatic noises about consulting
his government.

7^

1

His government's stance on the

subject had been clear for five years though, no NPT and
no first

introduction of nuclear weapons.

President

Johnson had at last attempted in conjunction with the

presentation of the NPT to use the arms and supply relationship with Israel as leverage to radically alter the
policy of Tel Aviv.

77

The administration was confident

that since the United States remained Israel's only re-

68

.

maimng ally

of consequence in the west
Jerusalem could

be "forced" to do the right thing.

Hence cancelling the

arms emDargo and suppressing the CIA
report can be seen
as preparation for the application
of coercion in the

Phantom deal.
in tact

this attempt by the United States
(despite

its proof of how salient the issue
could be)
to

failure.

was doomed

Ambassador Rabin began to quietly urge

pro Israeli members of the Humphrey campaign
to pres-

sure President Johnson into dropping this
requirement

from the agreement.

Boldly Rabin suggested to advisors

of Hubert Humphrey that the vice president would
reap
a

great “harvest" of Jewish voters if the NPT clause

was excised from the Phantom deal. 76

These pro-

israeli members of the Humphrey campaign included DNC

Chairman Lawrence O'Brien and Senator Henry Jackson,
both of whom urged

a

“no-str ings-attached" approach to

the Phantom deal on the candidate.

7

^

Between the

electoral pressure and Israeli diplomatic intransigence (as both Humphrey and Nixon were vociferous
supporters of the Hawk II deal without reservation), 60

Johnson was outflanked, lacking the time and political
capital to maintain pressure he was obliged to drop
the NPT clause and allow the aircraft to be sold

unimpeded

b9

Despite the failure of direct coercion
the administration continued to quietly negotiate
with Israel over
Che question of regional non-proliferation.

To this end

a

series of letters (as yet still classified)
were exchanged
between Ambassador Rabin and Undersecretary
Warnke in

early December of 19b& setting forth each
government's
views on the matter.

Having failed to force Israel to

sign the NFT the U.S. government was anxious
at least to
get lei Aviv to agree to a common definition
of the problem.

Using Israel's own formulation (no first "introduc-

tion

of nuclear weapons

into the region) as a starting

point Warnke construed introduction literally as meaning
Israel would not construct or deploy nuclear weapons.

Ambassador Rabin insisted that his government defined

non-introduction as meaning Israel would not test nuclear
weapons nor reveal their existence publicly.

The

Israeli stance is interesting as having signed the testban treaty in 19b4 Israel could not test such weapons any-

where in the region except below ground.

On the other

hand the geology and small size of Israel rule out under-

ground testing hence Rabin conceded
moot point.

a

readily accepted

As for publicly announcing the existence of

nuclear weapons it had long been Israeli policy to keep
their nuclear capabilities a close secret.

conceded nothing that was not already

70

a

In fact Rabin

part of Israeli

toreign policy ana on this note
the correspondence was
concluded with no satisfaction
given the United States.
This incident illustrates the
limitations of a high
saliency non-proliferation policy.
In this case, powerpredominance and a high saliency policy
were frustrated
by

the "power of the weak

11

client state via

link build-up during the 19b0s.

a

political

by the spring of 19bb

President Johnson clearly lacked the
power and, more
importantly, the time to deal successfully
with this
issue.

In some sense,

then,

circumstance and Israeli

political skill daunted U.S. non-proliferation
policy in
a hign saliency mode.

Undeniably the specific problem of Israeli nuclear
weapons were of high saliency for both the Kennedy
and

Johnson administrations. In all the high level encounters
between the chief executives of both countries the issue
is

constantly on the agenda.

changed

tine

to bolster

Kennedy fundamentally

arms relationship with Israel in an attempt

Israel

s

security so that the nuclear option

could be quietly dispensed with at

a

future date. Johnson

expanded the artns-relat ion and extracted certain concessions from the Israelis over the status of their nuclear

program.

however when the option oecame the reality of

nuclear weapons the leverage of

a

strong arms relation-

ship was insufficient to coerce accession to the MPT.

71
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Israel made no concessions that
it was not prepared
to make in order to strengthen
the political
ties to

America.

Having won

Israel was seen as
in

a

a

vital regional ally by many elements

the U.S. government,

became President.

major victory in the Six Day War

especially once Richard Dixon

With the Suez Canal "war" noticeably

escalating in violence no one in the U.S.
wanted to see
Israel abandoned at a crucial juncture.
Israel, having
pushed its military frontiers to the banks
of the Suez

Canal, was now involved in

a

series of sporadic artillery

duels, aerial dog fights, and other low-level
violence

with the Egyptian army.

6^

The overall intensity of the

conflict increased during the 19b9-1970 time period, 33
and Israel was understandably anxious to maintain its

qualitative military edge in the face of these diverse
provocations
Moreover

,

Congressional pressure and Rabin's con-

tacts in the presidential campaigns made it impossible
for the U.S.

to exploit the Phantom

Israel to accede to the DPT.

deal to "force"

Israeli policy was of

steady strength throughout the pressure of the 19b4-19bb
period.

This is attributable to the leadership's deter-

mination not to yield to persuasion/coercion and to their
own exploitation of the political tie to the U.S.

72
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The U.S. ability to alter Israeli
policy was diminished
(despite the issues nominal high
saliency) by circumstances, political resistance and
a strong political tie.
The new President Richard M.
Nixon
was not as

strongly committed to non-proliferation
policy as his
predecessor.
During the campaign he had called for
a
delay in Senate ratification of the NPT
as
for

the Soviet

invasion of Czechoslovakia.

a

retaliation
Nixon's

national security advisor Dr. Henry Kissinger
was also
known to be very critical of the Kennedy
/Johnson emphasis
on nuclear non-proliferation.

During and after the NPT's

negotiations Kissinger (while never publicly hostile to
the agreement) was emphatic

in

reiterating that

a

rigor-

ous and emphatic non-proliferation policy held long

range costs to U.S. national security.

In his book The

Troubled Partnership (1966) Kissinger makes

it

quite

clear that non-proliferation policy ought not to supersede U.S. -Soviet balance of power considerations.^

Although privately once he became national security
advisor, Dr. Kissinger did make

a

number of critical
OC

comments about the NPT in general.

Within the first three months of his Presidency
Nixon was carefully briefed on the extent of Israel's

nuclear preparations based on new intelligence uncovered
by

the CIA.

Ironically

it

was at this rump meeting of

73

the national security council that
evidence was presented

indicating that the first Phantom II-E jets
delivered to
Israel were being used to simulate nuclear
bombing runs.

Moreover an extensive CIA-FBI report was presented
that
dealt with alleged Israel industrial-nuclear
espionage

within the United States.

Most damning of all was an FBI

account of the illegal diversion of fissionable material
from

Pennsylvania nuclear plant to Israel

a

1966.

in

Apparently some 200 pounds of weapons grade enriched
uranium was spirited out of the NUMEC plant in Apollo,

Pennsylvania by Israeli agents with the alleged aid of

NUMEC

s

President and CEO, Dr. Zalman Shapiro.

^

The

inquiry though brought to the attention of the U.S.

government almost three years later was never followed
up upon.

Nixon's interest in non-proliferation was virtually

non-existent compared to Kennedy and Johnson's, though
on February 10,

U.S.

1969 he dutifully requested that the

Senate no longer delay ratification of the non-

proliferation treaty.

88

In public Nixon called

for

the widest possible adherence to the treaty insisting

that the treaty was an important step in our "endeavor
to curb the spread of nuclear weapons."

89

The U.S.

Senate eventually passed the treaty making the United
States one of the three depository powers for all adher-

74

ents.

Privately however, Nixon's policy views
on the

treaty were radically different, at
on February 5,

a

meeting of the NSC

1969 these views were summarized in the

form of National Security Council Decision
Memorandum #6.

This policy brief written in part by Morton Halperin
and

Harold Saunders insisted there were to be no efforts
on
the part of the U.S.

government to "pressure" foreign

governments to sign the treaty. 90

In

particular the

federal government of West Germany was singled out in

NSC-DM #6 as being exempt from "coercion" of any type
(regardless of the fact that Bonn's accession to the
treaty was

a

prerequisite for Soviet participation).

Other nations were singled out as being exempt from any

pressure from the U.S. also, unfortunately the full text
of NSC-DM #6 has never been declassified hence one can

only speculate as to which other nations the memo specifies.

It

is

safe to assume though, given Nixon's past

pro-Israeli rhetoric that Israel was certainly one of
those "other nations" in question.

If a

fellow member

of NATO was not going to "be coerced," then certainly

Israel (whose ability to daunt Washington's will was

already on record regarding non-proliferation) could
expect little further trouble from the U.S.
One could surmise that President Nixon was simply

attempting to inaugurate

a

less-heavy handed approach to

75

the issue.

If

so,

then why ignore the uranium diversion

case in Pennsylvania?

system applied.

At least there the U.S.

legal

Moreover not pressuring West Germany to

sign the treaty was

a

direct contraver t ion of

a

tacit

understanding with the U.S.S.R. dating from
1966--no NPT
without a Bonn accession.
In addition NSC-DM
#6 ex-

plicitly states that the U.S. Government was to
constantly publicly express positive sentiments for
the
treaty while privately foregoing any attempt to
press
for multiple accession.

This duplicity alone tends to

indicate that Richard Nixon came into office with

a

strong predilection to forego the entire question of

non-proliferation.

The saliency therefore of the issue

went from al all time high almost immediately to an all
time low chiefly due to the change in administrations
and the attendent redefinition of regional interests.
In

late 1969 the last informal inspection team was

sent into Dimona from the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission.

They subsequently reported to the NSC that based on their

inspection of the complex they could not verify fully
that

a

diversion of nuclear material had not occurred

for military purposes.

91

It

is

significant that this

occurred after the Six Day War and well within the time
context set down in Richard Helm's secret report of

January 1968.

Most important of all, after 1969,

76

the

informal inspection regime set-up by
President Johnson
and Prime Minister Esbkol was quietly
discontinued.*^
In part

this is attributable to the progressively
more

unsatisfying nature of the visits for the U.S. team
as
the sixties wore on but

it

is

also an indication that

the new administration no longer wished to
emphasize the

issue.

Since 1970,

the State Department has reluctantly

conducted all its relations with Israel on the assumption
that Jerusalem possessed nuclear weapons.

This was re-

vealed at an executive session of the U.S. Senate Foreign

Relations Committee in April 1970
briefing by CIA Director Helms.

Washington was on

a

in

the course of

a

The new emphasis in

comprehensive regional peace as

exemplified by the "Rodgers plan" of 1969 (named for U.S.

Secretary of State William Rodgers).

This particular

peace play attempted to settle all the major issues in
the Middle East in one package to be negociated at an

international conference.

Nowhere in this scheme was

the question of non-proliferation dealt with in any way
as

now the spread of nuclear weapons was at best

ondary interest of the United States.

94

a

sec-

This is the

long term result of the Six Day War and the new issues
that
a

it

generated, nuclear weapons were simply no longer

priority for the new administration in the rush to

77

press for

a

package deal.

As it turns out none of the

Arab states nor for that fact Israel
ever warmed to the
Rodgers plan, the Arabs criticized its
provisions regarding the occupied lands whilst Israel
refused to attend

conference that did not recognize its
existence

a

a

prior-

ity.

Nonetheless for the next three years the U.S.
will
continue to offer various revised comprehensive
plans

for

settlement in the region none of them garnering

a

much support. 95
Israel on the other hand now that it was free
of
the Kennedy-Johnson concern over non-proliferation
was

chiefly preoccupied with avoiding the convocation of an

international peace conference.

Levi Eshkol died in

early 1565 and was replaced by Golda Meir the former

Foreign Minister.
to

The new Prime Minister likewise tended

view the Arab-Israeli conflict in purely conventional

terms.

She had well documented suspicions about any

future reliance on nuclear weapons as

Unfortunately Meir inherited

a

a

deterrent.

somewhat more hawkish

defense minister on the nuclear issue (General Moshe
Dayan).
in

It

was Dayan along with other "nuclear hawks"

the Israeli government who probably successfully

pushed for nuclear bomb fabrication in the 1968-1970
period.
Arabs,

Given the lack of diplomatic progress with the
the escalating hostilities of the "War of Attri-

78
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tion

with Egypt and the lingering distrust
of U.S.
intentions after the Six Day War this was

the least the

Israeli leadership felt it could do.

The bomb became

a

very quiet reality for Israel essentially
on the cusp

between the Johnson and Nixon admini strat ions
Here the whole issue languished until October
of
1973 when the Yom Kippur War broke out.

prise,

Israel was initially thrown on the defensive by

the combined Egypt i an -Syr i an assault.
as

it

lost

Taken by sur-

So much so that

became apparent that the Golan Heights could be
if

the October

9

counterattack failed, orders were

supposedly issued by Prime Minister Meir on the advice
of Defense Minister Moshe Dayan to prepare several

nuclear weapons for immediate use.

As the Israeli

counterattack successfully recaptured the Golan on
October 10, the nuclear weapons were ordered to be
returned to their hidden arsenals. 97
The whole story behind nuclear weapons in the Yom

Kippur War may never be revealed.

However, there are

a

number of circumstantial facts that ought to be delineated.

It

has been alleged that the U.S. military

supply airlift to Israel that began on October 12, 1973
was in part motivated by Secretary of State Kissinger's
fear that if faced with defeat Israel might

threat of its nuclear weapons.

79

98

invoke the

The decision by the

U.s. administration to resupply Israel
in earnest

dj_d

occur after Israel had supposedly considered
and aborted
a possible field deployment of
nuclear weapons.
If

U.S.

intelligence sources indicated to the NSC that

Israel had already prepared its nuclear option
for use,
then it is safe to assume that this could have
been an

impetus to action in Washington.

Evidence suggests that at the time of the Yom
Kippur

Uar

the NSC did authorize an SR-71 overflight of

the Negev desert and the Dimona nuclear reactor spe-

cifically.

1^

0

This indicates that there was muted

concern in Washington over the exact status of the
Israeli nuclear arsenal in wartime.

Possibly President

Nixon and Secretary Kissinger were caught unawares and
were surprised at the quiet but blunt invocation of

nuclear weapons in
is

a

in a

a

crisis.

Clearly,

the "bomb option"

power ful form of leverage in Washington, especially
time of potential super-power confrontation.

one can see the "Sarajevo syndrome" in action:
U.S.

if

Here
the

feared an Israeli nuclear attack on its Arab oppo-

nents (with attendant consequences for the super-powers),
then the only course of action open to the U.S. was to

supply the Israelis with the conventional military

weapons

it

needed to confine the conflict below the

nuclear threshold.

80
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The answers to these questions
lie in the classified
files of the U.S. National Security
Council.

It

is,

however, known that in December of 1973
Dr. Kissinger

requested that the CIA update its three-year-old
study
of

Israel's nuclear weapons capability. 101

of

this request suggests that the Nixon
administration

desired current information about an issue
its best to ignore for

five years.

The timing

it

had done

This request to the

CIA also implies that perhaps President Nixon
and Secretary Kissinger were surprised at the strong leverage

potential in the Israeli weapons. 103
The United States,

deployment to press for

in
a

into effect on October 22,

turn,

was spurred by the

cease fire in place which went
1973.

103

If

the ambiguous

nature of Israel's nuclear capacity did not inhibit Arab
aggression,

then it certainly provided an extra incentive

for prompt U.S.

involvement,

first in the form of

a

mili-

tary supply airlift and also in the form of cease-fire
d

iplomacy
The October 22 cease-fire in place was immediately

broken in the Sinai Peninsula--whether

it

was the

Egyptians or Israelis has never been determined.

The

Soviets were apprehensive that the encircled Third

Egyptian Army was going to be annihilated in the Sinai.
Worse,

it

seemed that Israeli troops had reached the Suez

81
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Canal, cutting off the Egyptian line
of retreat. 104

Accordingly, on October 24, Russian airborne
troops were
placed on alert in Eastern Europe and the
Soviets sent a
strongly worded demand to the White House via
the hot
line link that a joint Soviet-Amer ican
expedition

be sent

to the Sinai

to enforce the cease-fire. 105

the Russians made vague threats that

comply,

if

Moreover,

the U.S.

they would move unilaterally to enforce

didn't
a

cease-

fire between Egypt and Israel with combat troops under
the guise of an as-yet proposed U.N.
100
resolut ion
In addition,

Security Council

disturbing and unclear intelligence

had reached Washington on October 24 to the effect that
the U.S.S.R.

had shipped

number of nuclear warheads by

a

freighter to Egypt to be mounted on the Soviet Scud-B
tactical missiles deployed near Cairo. 10
true,

then it constituted

a

7
'

If

this was

challenge to the Israelis

strategically and to American diplomacy specifically.
For the second time in twelve days,

the United States

was being forced to act due to the introduction of

veiled nuclear threats in the region.
The White House interpreted this as an ultimatum
and recoiled at the thought of reintroducing Soviet

troops into Egypt, or worse, Soviet and Egyptian nuclear
armed forces acting in concert against Israel.
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108

As

such,

the Soviet proposal was rejected
on October 25.

The White House then reacted on two
main levels:

(a)

the

Israeli cabinet was warned to refrain from
any provocative acts in the Sinai and (b) based on
Secretary of

State Kissinger's recommendation, President Nixon
ordered
all U.S. military forces go to

alert.

Defense Condition III

a

is

Defense Condition III
practice the highest

in

stage of military preparedness for the U.S. at peacetime.

This,

along with some very explicit threats

publicly made by Secretary Kissinger the next day, served
notice to Moscow that military intervention was unacceptable to the United States.

Local restraint at the front

and Soviet caution quickly defused the situation.

The

Russians saw no need to carry out their threat.
This was less an example of the U.S. going to great

lengths to protect Israel and more
a

a

question of meeting

perceived challenge from the U.S.S.R. 110

While

Israeli nuclear preparations may have promoted

a

more

activist diplomacy on the part of the U.S., the DefCon
alert served only to warn the Israelis of the highly

constrained circumstances under which the U.S. would
elect to extend its deterrence.

Israeli decision-makers

tended in the diplomatically tangled aftermath of the

Yom Kippur War to note the cupidity with which the U.S.

considered the resupply of Israeli forces at the crucial

83

moment along with Washington’s
attempts to court Egypt
during and after the war.
The U.S. did undertake a quiet
review of its Middle Eastern policy
after the war, but
more importantly, the Israelis began
to fear again that
U.S. military support was unreliable.
Jerusalem thought
that the U.S. wasn't going to worry
about Israeli sur-

vival,

save only in the event that

confrontation was threatened. 111

a

In

possible super-power
the 1973-75 period

Israel lost what little faith it had in

a

credible secur-

ity guarantee from Washington.

More than faith,
war.

though, was lost as

The whole concept of

a

general peace settlement was

thoroughly discredited in Washington.
U.S.

result of the

a

In

the aftermath,

diplomacy in the person of Henry Kissinger confined

itself to the very narrow issue of brokering

a

series of

armstice agreements between the three antagonists.

What

the Yom Kippur War did demonstrate was that despite

varied past attempts to the contrary,

the Middle East

had become (and could well become again) an arena for
U.S. -Soviet confrontation.

In

turn,

this "confrontation"

has and will be again complicated by the ambiguous de-

terrent of Israel's nuclear capabilities.

The "Sarajevo

syndrome" referred to earlier was very much on most of
the participating decision-makers' minds throughout this

crisis.

Despite its peaceful conclusion,
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the sad

truth

IS

that very little was undertaken
to rectify the danger

of

a

nuclear confrontation (on anyone's
part) in the
region.
The Nixon administration then
entered the twilight

of the Watergate scandal at this
point.

Nixon's own

thinking was increasingly focused on
his own political
survival, while Secretary Kissinger
concentrated on a
regional "piecemeal" approach.

In effect,

abandoned the top-down in favor of

mental approach.

a

Kissinger

very careful incre-

The Nixon policy of near neglect on

questions dealing with non-proliferation also underwent
a

certain amount of revision during the 1973-74 period.

This was

a

result of India's unexpected acquisition of

"peaceful" nuclear weapons

in

the spring of 1974.

Accordingly, the President instructed Kissinger to
organize
(#202)

a

revamped national security study memorandum

redefining U.S. policy on critical issues of

nuclear trade and supply.

As

a

proliferation then rose somewhat
U.S.,

general category, nonin

saliency for the

although chiefly what the administration sought

were tighter restrictions on the export of nuclear technology to Third World countries. 112
This is ironic, given the fact that in the desperate
final two months of his administration Richard Nixon,

while touring the Middle East, publicly offered to Cairo
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and Jerusalem

a

set of jointly controlled nuclear

desalinization plants.

Specifically, he offered U.S.

money and technology to build two 900-megawatt
light
water seaside nuclear reactors, one in Egypt and
one in
Israel.

Both complexes were to be placed under total

IAEA safeguards so as to prevent any dissemination of

material for military purposes.

This idea dates back to

the Eisenhower administration's old "Atoms for Peace"

program.

It

was thought that plentiful access to fresh

water would alleviate the economic problems of the
region,

dilemma.

thus having
It was

a

salutory effect on the political

also hoped by Nixon that

desalinization project

in

a

nuclear

Israel would build up Israeli

confidence in the reliability and efficacity of IAEA
safeguards.

Predictably,

the proposal garnered little support

and much criticism in the U.S.

Congress as an example of

an unnecessary technology transfer

tile area of the world.

to an extremely vola-

The Israeli public and cabinet

were extremely suspicious (as they always have been) of
any type of nuclear technology transfer to Egypt.

mately,

Ulti-

the whole proposal fell through once President

Nixon resigned in August.

Apparently no one

region could see any reason for such
tion of nuclear safeguards.
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a

in

the

limited applica-

On this note the Nixon
administration came to an
end,

for although

the whole concept of nuclear
non-

proliferation enjoyed
1974,

a

resurgence after the spring of

the specific case of Israel became
as usual

distinctly secondary priority.

a

The new U.S. President,

Gerald Ford, considered the spread of
nuclear weapons to
be a much more dangerous and significant
trend overall
than did his predecessor.
It was during the Ford administration (as

a

result of the findings of NSC-#202) that

concrete steps were taken to promote nuclear supplier
controls on relevant transfers to non-NPT parties.

As

Israel did little if any importing on the world nuclear

market,

this did not represent any specific threat to

their nuclear program.
As with both of his

i

mm ediate predecessors, Ford

was fully briefed as to the nature and extent of Israeli

nuclear activities in late 1975 by the CIA.
were as disquieting as they were

Kippur War,

Israel had maintained

in
a

1968.

The facts

Since the Yom

stready production

of nuclear weapons and was pressing ahead with the

development of ever more sophisticated missile delivery
systems.

The conventional wisdom still held,

though,

that trying to renew pressure on Israel to sign the NPT

would needlessly expend diplomatic capital (which was
short supply after the protracted Sinai disengagement
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in

accords).
sion,

In addition,

since the Indian nuclear explo-

the White House and the State
Department were ex-

tremely doubtful about the treaty's
long term effectiveness.
New initiatives were simply too much
to press for

m

the delicate post-1973 environment

for both the U.S.

and Israel.

President Carter came into office with

a

strong

general commitment to both nuclear
non-proliferation and
to some kind of peace in the Middle
East.
In September
of

1977 at

a

White House meeting, President Carter

brought up the issue of Israel's nuclear arsenal
per-

sonally with then-Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan.
This is the first time (that we know of) where

a

U.S.

President dealt with the subject bluntly with an Israeli
official, on the assumption that such weapons did exist.

Dayan gave, by all accounts,

a

terse and unsatisfactory

answer to President Carter, who wanted to know (in all

likelihood) under what terms Israel would forego its

nuclear option.

Undaunted, President Carter promised to

take the issue up with Prime Minister Begin personally,
but it is not publicly known if such an inquiry was made
and what the outcome was.

The exchange occurred during

a

Washington Minis-

terial Summit that discussed the possibility of recon-

vening the long- langu i shed Geneva regional peace con-
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ference.

Secretary Vance made several overtures
to
Foreign Minister Dayan about the
possibility
of an

American security guarantee to Israel to
follow a successful peace settlement.
Dayan himself was suspicious
of such an offer and with consummate
irony replied that

such

guarantee would only be necessary against
Soviet
aggression.
The idea was never expanded upon,
a

as the

Geneva conference was not reconvened.
Anwar Sadat's December 1977 visit to Jerusalem,
and
the possibility of

a

strictly bilateral peace accord

between Egypt and Israel eventually superceded any
U.S.

designs for

a

"general" solution.

In

fact,

at

the

September 1978 Camp David talks, one of President Sadat's
opening positions in the negotiations called for
nuclear weapons ban in the Middle East. 115

a

Dutifully,

President Carter transmitted these proposals to Prime

Minister Begin, who rejected the nuclear weapons ban.
His grounds for rejection were legalistic.

Begin con-

tended that such an accord would have to be multilateral
to be effective and Sadat

in

for all the Arab states.

Quietly (perhaps as planned)

this context did not speak

the proposal was dropped by the Egyptians.
If

the "top-down" approach risks perpetually de-

ferring nuclear proliferation,

then the "bottom-up"

approach cannot immediately prioritize this issue on
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a

regional basis.

This is especially

the case of Camp David,

a

problem when as in

only two countries are involved

who have

a

was in

a

way correct to refute the nuclear ban as
in the

end

only obtained nuclear peace with one Arab
country.

it

There is
tion.

a

wide disparity of nuclear development.

Begin

dichotomous view here of regional prolifera-

The Arabs contend that Israel is the proliferation

problem in the area.

Israel,

nuclear proliferation as

piecemeal

a

though,

officially regards

regional problem.

Carter's

approach also built on an agenda constructed

by Henry Kissinger which was one that strongly emphasized

territorial and sovereignty questions at the expense of
nuclear proliferation.

Despite President Carter's strong

interest in slowing the spread of nuclear weapons, he was

daunted by two factors.

First,

that the Israelis already

had a deployed secret nuclear force during

sor's tenure.

a

predeces-

Thus the question became one of arms con-

trol for undeclared nuclear powers rather than pure non-

proliferation.

Secondly, coming so close to

a

real

diplomatic breakthrough with the peace treaty, there
a

is

strong tendency to avoid complicating side issues like

nuclear weapons.

Agenda items like nuclear proliferation

tend to be put off until
Of course,

ten-year trend.

a

new round of negotiations.

four years is

a

short time to reverse

President Carter found there was not
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a

enough time to get down to specifics
with Israel.
The
Carter administration did approve the
1977 International
Security Assistance Act, though.
This was a law designed
to prevent the export of sensitive
nuclear technologies
to known "proliferation-minded"
countries.
One of its
little known codicils (known as the "Symington
Amend-

ment") forces the U.S. government to suspend
military
and economic aid to an^ country that
manufactures or
detonates a nuclear device. 116 This meant that the
U.S. government had

a

powerful weapon

public with the bomb, or even if

a

if

Israel ever went

future U.S. government

finally decided to put an end to "ambiguity."
legacy on the issue

is

Carter's

that "going public" for better or

worse entails immediate material costs for Israel.
In addition,

during the last fifteen years there

have been leaks of CIA intelligence reports to the U.S.

Congress and the press detailing some of the critical

aspects of the Israeli nuclear weapons program.

One in

1974 and again in 1978 nominally outdated reports were

"accidentally" released to the public, making
at

it

clear

least to the Israelis that the U.S. government was

not unaware of the situation.

117

These are too many

news leaks to be entirely coincidental.

desired to activate public debate in
On the other hand,

a

Perhaps the CIA

roundabout manner.

the Ford and Carter administrations

91

could have made

discreet decision to "put Israel
on

a

notice" that their nuclear ambiguity

is

a

tenuous thing

that an outside power could terminate
if necessary by

publishing its relevant intelligence files
and thus
centering interest on the Israeli nuclear
option in
crisis

a

.

On September 22,

1979,

a

U.S.

surveillance satellite

detected in the south Atlantic what appeared
to be
nuclear blast event.

a

Subsequent secret investigations

on the part of the Carter White House revealed
circum-

stantial evidence that implicated the South Africans
and

possibly the Israelis in the alleged nuclear test.

A

secret White House panel convened to review the evidence,

concluded that the evidence was inconclusive to determine
if

a

nuclear explosion had occurred. 118

The official

U.S. position opted to assume publicly that the nuclear

event was
In part,

a

satellite malfunction and not

a

nuclear test.

this view is fueled by the fact that no nuclear

fallout, blast effect, or corroborating satellite readings were recorded at the time of the event.

cently, new evidence has come to light,

Re-

indicating that

the original findings of the special panel were erroneous

and that in fact

a

two-kiloton nuclear test did actually

happen on that date, which was the result of IsraeliSouth African collaboration.

120
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In

fact,

allegations

have arisen accusing the NSA of
withholding decisive
intelligence information dealing with
Israeli involvement
in

the test.

Possibly this was out of fear that
exposure

of the truth would mean cutting off
all aid to Israel

under the Symington Amendment,

thus destroying the Camp

David peace process (which sets an ominous
precedent).

Regardless of current speculation, there are compelling reasons to remain skeptical of at least
Israeli
involvement with this "event," the most obvious being
that Jerusalem signed the test ban treaty in good
faith
in

1963 and atmospheric nuclear testing in the south

Atlantic constitutes

a

flagrant violation of that treaty.

Also, why would the Israelis undertake

a

conspicuous

atmospheric nuclear test (thereby running the risk of
public exposure of their nuclear potential) at

a

t

ime

when negotiations with the U.S. and Egypt to settle all

aspects of

a

peace treaty were at their most intense?

Could Israel really take

a

chance on Washington's for-

bearance (no matter how much

a

needed by the administration)

While there

is

diplomatic success was
in

such

a

flagrant act?

much disquieting evidence to indicate

close convention and nuclear cooperation between

Praetoria and Jerusalem, there

is

as yet no definite

evidence that an above-ground nuclear test occurred
under Israeli sponsorship in the south Atlantic.
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The

only evidence of Israeli involvement
as yet being still
classified NSA intelligence data and
journalistic

accounts based on undisclosed sources.

Governor Ronald Reagan, elected President
in 1980,
came to office with

a

declared "hands-off" policy towards

nuclear non-proliferation. 121

During the 1980 primary

campaign, Reagan had stated that non-proliferation
was
"none of our business."

Clearly the problem was un-

important to the incoming administration.

Moreover, he

clearly wanted to de-emphasize the whole Camp David peace
process in favor of deterring Soviet penetration into
the Middle East.

The loss of emphasis on the Camp

David process (which was heading towards

a

U

.

S

.

-broker ed

resolution for the Palestinians) was compensated for
Israel by Reagan's efforts to forestall Soviet regional
"ad ventur ism."
It

is

natural,

therefore,

for

the Reagan administra-

tion to strengthen the strategic and political links to
the state of Israel,

as Jerusalem is a nominally anti-

communist democratic state with
of

the U.S.S.R.'s

intentions.

Israel quickly negotiated
ity agreement

in

a

a

longstanding suspicion

To this end,

the U.S.

and

vaguely-worded mutual secur-

the spring of 1981.

It

is

a

pretty

tame document, actually, calling for $42.5 million in

increased military grants, joint rapid deployment force

exercises,
Fleet and
dentals.

Israeli docking rights for the U.S.
Sixth
a

free trade agremeent, among other
inci-
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There

is

no formal security pledge or

promise of troops to Israel, nor

is

there any attempt to

deal with nuclear weapons or local questions
of deterrence,

save those involving the U.S.S.R.

this agreement appears to be

a

On the surface,

half-step towards

security guarantee for Israel, but in fact

nothing more than

by Israel

a

shopping list of items long coveted

(conventional cluster bombs,

Primarily,

it

is

a

really

is

recapitulation of U.S. anti-Soviet

a

rhetoric linked to

it

a

for example).

response to an alleged Soviet nuclear

guarantee given to Syria

in

late 1974.

the U.S.S.R. has allegedly given

a

12Zt

Of course,

similar guarantee to

Egypt in 1966, but given subsequent events in Moscow-

Cairo relations, the reliability of the Soviet pledge
open to question.

In

fact,

is

the Israelis acquiesced to

the security agreement most reluctantly,

as

they've had

little faith in American pledges of explicit support

since the Yom Kippur War.

question

is

In fact,

the agreement

simply no basis upon which to build

a

in

secur-

ity guarantee that would dissuade Israel from deploying

nuclear weapons.

It

is

a

solution whose time had passed.

President Reagan's policy initially did not concern
itself with regional proliferation,
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or,

for that matter,

any relevant approaches

regional peace.

(top-down or bottom-up) to

Nonetheless,

improvised when on June

7,

a

policy would need to be

1981 the Israeli Air Force

attacked (with American F-15s) the
French-built Iraqi
Tamuz I nuclear reactor, totally destroying
it with conventional bombs.
Prime Minister Begin insisted defiantly
that the reactor was at the center of

a

covert Iraqi

nuclear weapons program, being conducted
despite Iraq's

membership in the IAEA and its full accession
to the

non-proliferation treaty.
Israeli cabinet that

It was

the belief of the

nuclear weapon produced from this

a

program (regardless of Iraq's then-genoc idal war with
Iran) would ultimately be used as

Israel.

a

threat against

Many observers within Israel at the time though,

believed that the raid was motivated less on security
ground and more with the upcoming Israeli national elections in mind. 126
to be if

As

a

result,

the new policy seemed

Israel would not be the first nation to intro-

duce nuclear weapons into the region,

then neither would

any other country be permitted to "be first," either. 19 7
As such,

the Reagan administration's reaction to the

raid was equivocal.

On the one hand,

demned as an unnecessary use of force.

the raid was con-

However,

the U.S.

adamantly refused to impose serious sanctions on Israel
beyond delaying ratification of the security agreement
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and suspending the sale of
F-16s for six months. 128
U.S. condemnation was required
so as to reassure Arab

moderates (Jordan and Saudi Arabia)
and to placate the
outraged opinion of potential anti-Soviet
regional
allies.

The administration only went
so far as to support a U.N. Security Council
Resolution 487, which condemned the raid and called upon Israel
to place all its

nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. 128

making

a

Beyond

few noises about violations of both
the U.S.

Arms Export Act and the near-forgotten
Mutual Defense

Assistance Pact of 1951, this was the extent of
the U.S.
so
government's wrath.
1

Israel demonstrates its harsh opinion of the worth
of the non-proliferation treaty in general and

guards in particular.

It

is

in safe-

ironic that in late 1982

the U.S. had to go to elaborate lengths to prevent the

general conference of the IAEA (which

is

dominated by

hostile Third World countries) from ejecting Israel from
its membership entirely.

Ultimately,

on to its membership,

a

but at

Israel held

high cost to U.S. credi-

bility in that organization, although

a

condemnatory

resolution of Israel's pre-emptive attack was passed by
a

wide margin.
The raid is

the U.S.

a

prime example of how little leverage

has over Israel regarding any aspect of nuclear
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weapons policy.

would seem that the political
tie is

It

so strong in certain

effective action
sible.

As

in

stra t

eg i c-based respects that

the area of nuclear arms is
impos-

result of the Osiraq raid, the Reagan
White

a

House was compelled to belatedly
generate

nuclear non-proliferation policy.

a

coherent

Eventually, in its

emphasis on the NPT and the IAEA, supplier
controls and
constuctive engagement, the Reagan policy,
once enunciated, would strongly resemble the Carter
policy minus
the apocalyptic rhetoric.
A purely U S -centered solution to the
problem
.

.

consistently foundered
ineptitude,

in

the Car ter -Reagan years due to

ignorance and neglect.

the late 1970s and early 1980s,
on another

front.

In

Suprisingly, during

progress was being made

the U.N. General Assembly in 1980

the Israeli delegation quietly dropped

conventional arms control prerequisite to
nuclear weapons ban.

a

a

regional

This was in response to

Egyptian plan to create
free zone.

long-time

its

a

a

proposed

Middle Eastern nuclear weapons

Israel and Egypt went so far as to co-sponsor

General Assembly Resolution calling for the establish-

ment of

a

regional nuclear weapons free zone.

Differ-

ences did occur over the initial composition of such an
accord, with Egypt desiring universal regional accession
to the NPT as

a

prerequisite to
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a

general conference on

non-proliferation.

Israel, on the other hand, wished
to

circumvent any link to the NPT and proceed
directly to a
multilateral conference. Of course, the
problem here for
more intransigent Arab states is that
a nuclear weapons
ban conference means recognizing Israel's
nuclear weapons
force, which to their minds is tantamount
to recognizing

Israel's political existence.

option for them.

This is an intolerable

Any nuclear weapons free zone would

involve implicit guarantees of Israeli security in
he
form of an inspection and verification system that
all
states,

including Israel, could have confidence in.^^

The model that Israel and Egypt looked toward is the

Latin American Treaty of Tlatelolco, which by and large

satisfies all participants' minimum requirements for
nuclear security.

Fundamentally,

Israel sees the problems of nuclear

weapons proliferation to be regional in character, but
also one that is apparently separable from certain other

general political problems in the area.

In

this case,

issue linkage on the part of the "Re ject ionist Front,"
be it the Palestinians or the Occupied Territories or
the Lebanon War prevented any progress on the question
of a regional nuclear ban.

The fact that Israel and

Egypt could cooperate to this extent at the U.N. over
such

a

far-reaching issue

is

some proof as to the effi-
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cacity of Carter’s bottom-up
approach to regional issues.
Unfortunately, at this time the Camp
David process seems
unreproduc able with any other Arab
states for a number
of reasons, lack of innovative
leadership
in Israel and

elsewhere,

lack of U.S.

interest in such an approach,

and currently the Palestinian rising
in the Occupied
133
Territories.
The U.S., of course, consistently

voted in favor of the Egypt ian- I srael i
weapons freeze

proposal at the U.N 134
.

The appeal of this approach

is

that

it

takes the

United States "off the hook" as to providing
the impetus
towards non-proliferation.

For Israel,

it

would grant

limited recognition via the "back door," so to speak.
The Arabs would have all their fears of an Israeli

nuclear threat dispelled once and for all.

The nuclear

free zone so far is the only non-proliferation proposal

embraced by both Arabs and Israelis.

Moreover,

it

points to the heretical notion that the best solution to

regional nuclear proliferation lies within initiatives

generated and enforced by local states, and not with any

program explicitly linked with any super-powers.
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CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

We have seen issue saliency in the U.S. government
vary radically over the last twenty years,

from the high

importance that non-proliferation

is

and Johnson administrations,

militantly passive

to

a

held in the Kennedy

policy of acquiescence to Israeli nuclear weapons as

practiced by the Nixon administration.
saliency,

though,

is

The problem with

that as important as the issue was

for the Kennedy- Johnson administrations,

telling oppor-

tunities to forcibly dissuade Israel from weapons devel-

opment were passed up until too late.

The fact is that

President Johnson attempted to coerce Israel into accepting the NPT with time as too critical a factor

in his

personal authority with Israel so close to developing an
atom bomb.
and await

Tel Aviv could afford to defy the President
a

new administration.

Hence,

if

Israel's nuc-

lear potential was of high saliency during the sixties,

then it is also true that its nuclear weapons were not
of "ultimate" saliency to U.S.

national security.

All

other contending diplomatic factors considered, this
issue alone was not worth an all-out diplomatic confron-

tation despite longstanding expressed U.S.

interest in

preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to the region.
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Throughout the 1960s and 1970s Israel had
one simple
goal, the development of

purposes of

a

nuclear weapons option or the

bargaining tool and as an ambiguous threat

a

against the Arabs.

When U.S. policy shifted and changed,

reflecting new interests being defined by new decisionmakers,

Israeli policy remained stable.

The ultimate

survival and unprecedented growth of the Israeli nuclear

arsenal is

a

consequence of U.S. policy instability.

Once Israel reached the point of no return (some
time between 1969 and 1971),

the question of pure dis-

suasion became one of how to deal with

a

clearly defined

but as yet unannounced sixth nuclear power.

The Ford,

Carter, and Reagan administrations have all had to deal

with this new stage in U.S. -Israeli nuclear diplomacy.

There

is

had

more urgent view of the matter, but correspondingly

a

no question that Ford,

Carter and the CIA all

their options were fewer than those available to the U.S.
in

the 1960s.

This is due to the strength of the politi-

cal link from Israel to the U.S.
by the 1970s).

the NPT,

(which was quite strong

The United States' own suspicions about

the changing approaches Washington favored

towards the region, and as said previously, the fait

accompli of existing Israeli nuclear bombs.

From this fait accompli, no subsequent U.S. administration (no matter how salient non-proliferation in the
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!

region may be) has ever regained the full
initiative.
Why?
Because as yet no acceptable political
formula has
been ge nerated by anyone to affect the nuclear
disarmament of relatively small nations with
correspondingly

miniscule nuclear forces once acquisition of the
nuclear
weapons option occurs.
For that fact, no "disarmament
formula

has ever been successfully implemented to deal

with the huge nuclear stockpiles of the U

.

S

.

A

.

/U S S R
.

.

.

.

The two main regional diplomatic approaches favored

especially by the United States by and large do not seem
to prioritize questions of nuclear non-proliferation,

at

least as far as they have been acted upon by the Nixon-

Ford and Carter administrations.

Here again,

Israel's

if

nuclear weaponry is not of "original saliency" to

Washington, then the tendency

is

to either

ignore the

issue or else to relegate it to secondary status.

Although Carter's "piecemeal" diplomacy did indirectly
lay the groundwork for and Israel i-Egypt ian nuclear

weapons ban proposal at the U.N.

participation

it

is

Although without wider

hard to see if anything else can

presently be done with this proposal.

As for

a

general

settlement of the region's problems at an international
conference,

this is an idea that may never be imple-

mented, due to the inability of any of the participants
to even generally agree on an agenda--non-proli ferat ion

103

certainly can
Israel,

t

wait for this eventuality.

though, has managed to keep all its
options

open down through the years.

The strategy of ambiguity

that Israel favors is in turn strongly
complemented by
the low saliency that the whole issue possessed
for the

U.S., especially in the critical 1969-1975 period.

Of

critical importance for Tel Aviv has been its ability
to

portray itself as

a

strategic asset to the United States

government and also to cultivate strong political allegiances within potent social groups with the American
polity.

Since 1966,

the overall effect of this political

link has been to reinforce the idea from within and

without the United States that Israel

is

a

"political

investment," one that could not be discarded easily.
This link made possible the lifting of the NPT clause in
the 1968 Phantom II deal and generally contributed to
the hands-off policy of the Nixon-Ford administrations.

After the Yom Kippur War,

the rise of the political

link with Jerusalem ensured that policy shifts toward

Israel entailed potential political costs for

administration.
issue

a

Thus,

U.S.

lacking the domestic consensus to

security guarantee to Israel and concurrently

lacking the political will to force

proliferation, the U.S. government
more,

a

the role of the U

.

S

.

-

as -arb i
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a

is
tra t

showdown on nonstymied.

Further-

or was undercut by

the rise in Soviet influence in the
region during the
late 1960s.
Washington now began to see Israel as
an

informal strategic asset, hence the need
to maintain an
ally's power inhibited the U.S. power of
dissuasion
in

Jerusalem.

Strategically speaking, since 1969 Israel has

been an informal political client of the
United States,
but
a

it

one that has been difficult to integrate into

is

larger regional diplomatic framework.

Which points towards

a

reluctant role change on the

part of the U.S. government-- that was encouraged
somewhat
by Israel.

In

the short space of nine years (1960-1969),

the U.S. went from being

detached arbitrator to being

a

chief arms supplier and military patron of the state of
Israel.

America

s

ability to pursue certain unilateral

policies in the region were correspondingly constrained.
Israel went from

a

nuclear aspirant to

a

full-fledged

undeclared nuclear power, and in turn became

a

virtual

international pariah state after the 1967 Six Day War.
Moreover,
but
in

a

Israel became

client of the United States,

a

particularly independent client capable especially

the area of nuclear politics of maintaining its

priorities over those of the patron.
These role changes,

in

some sense, help determine

the relative importance of particular national security

issues.

In

the end,

if we

in

the United States consider

105

nuclear non-proliferation to be of paramount
importance
down through the years, then in turn we must
ask whether
or not a client /ally

'

s

acquisition of nuclear weapons

is

important enough to require an active policy of
dissuasion,

better, disarmament.

or,

This is

a

difficult

proposition, as when the government affirms its opposition to the spread of nuclear weapons it not only con-

tends with purely national power-seeking behavior, but
it

must also oppose an international trend or process.

This trend towards proliferation

is

transnational in

character and originates in the easy access to nuclear

weapons information.

general problem,

overcome

a

Hence,

in

trying to combat the

the U.S. must tailor

its policies to

multilateral antagonist.

The U.S. has made it abundantly clear that it

regards regional proliferation to have grave consequences
for

international relations.

Israel, being the most ad-

vanced nuclear power in the Middle East, has more often
than not been the main recipient of U.S. persuasion on
this issue.

Jerusalem, however, sees the problem as

a

regional one, encompassing the need to suppress multilateral suspicions about each other's nuclear research
and reduce the mutual risk of

Arabs,

in turn

a

nuclear conflict.

The

(paradoxically enough) see the issue in

terms vaguely similar to those of the U.S.,

106

the main

danger of nuclear weapons exclusively stems
from Israel.
Hence, there are mutually exclusive viewpoints
at work
here that must be reconciled.
The process of reconciliation then perhaps is at the core of

a

new stable long-

range U.S. non-proliferation policy for Israel and
the
region.

Yet this cannot occur until the U.S. makes an

imporvement on past practice, abandonging passive

acquiescence, outdated rhetoric and equivocation over
how important this one case of non-proliferation really
is.

The answer is:

it

is

important and it must be

acted upon.
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